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WTO TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT STANDARD RENDERING CHINA-
RARE EARTHS GATT ARTICLE XX EXEMPTIONS IMPOSSIBLE AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAWS INCOMPATIBLE
FENGPING GAO
I. INTRODUCTION
This article critically reviews China - Measures Related to the Exportation
of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum (the China-Rare Earths' case), from
the perspective of the Article XX (b) and (g) of The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).2 The purposes of this article include: 1) to reveal, regarding
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") trade and environment, that the China-
Rare Earths case could have been decided through an alternative legal basis, and
2) to evaluate the international scholars who thought that the Panel's isolated
textual approach was wrong and the theoretical judgment of the case was not
sound. An empirical study at both the macroeconomic level and the
microeconomic level demonstrates the comprehensive policy in dispute actually
has been working "as a whole" since the early 2000s. Also, this research shows
that the China-Rare Earths case ruling has caused a devastating consequence on
the whole rare earth industry.
Part I of this article provides background on the rare earth industry and its
trade, while Part II briefly summarizes the principle substantive issues of the
China-Rare Earths case. Part III reviews GATT Article XX (b) and (g). Part IV
analyzes the rules of GATT Article XX (b) and (g) as applied to the China-Rare
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1. Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten and Molybdenum, WTO Does. WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (July
8, 2014) [hereinafter China-Rare Earths Case].
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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Earths case and finds that this case is extraordinary. First of all, it is arguable that
China might deserve a different application of law.3 In light of the fundamental
importance of the flexibilities provided in GATT Article XX, China invoked both
Article XX (b) and (g), respectively, for protection of human, animals and plants
life and conservation of exhaustible natural resources.4  The Panel decided the
environmental issue under Article XX (g); however, Article XX (b) policy issues
were not decided under Article XX (b) law, but on a different basis.5  Scholars
emphasize that the policy space governments enjoy to pursue legitimate objectives
under GATT Article XX (g) is more likely to be considered "disguised trade
restrictions" to pursue regulatory objectives and then tips the balance towards their
obligations under the GATT, while issues under Article XX (b) regarding
protection of human, animals and plants life require a lower standard of "burden of
persuasion." 6 Secondly, the standard of the Article XX (g) has become next to
impossible to qualify domestically legitimate environmental policy for the
specified exemption, although there could be a theoretical chance. Part V
reiterates that this extreme standard contradicts the Preamble of the WTO, the
Marrakesh Agreement, and the purpose of the GATT Article XX. Moreover, as
illustrated in the China-Rare Earths case, McRae's summarization of the WTO as
a market access agency is apt.' The WTO's continuing reliance on the working
principles of trade and environment in order to make its rulings is outdated and
inconsistent with human rights and the international community environmental
efforts for better living conditions.8 Part VI follows the study in the transitional
economy on both China's "continuing" reform policy and the case study on the
China Northern Rare Earths, the world's number one rare earths producer. 9 The
findings echo the scholar's view that the objectives of industry reorganization,
resource conservation, and environmental protection are integrated. Part VII
presents empirical follow-up research that has found the disastrous consequence is
3. The Panel decided the case based on China's Accession Protocol rather than on GATT art.
XX (b). Panel Report, China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and
Molybdenum, 1 7.3.2.1.7, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, WT/DS433/R (Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter
China-Rare Earths Panel Report].
4. GATT, supra note 2, art. XX (b), (g).
5. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 7.6.2.3.
6. Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Environment, Trade, and the WTO Constraint: Bop Till
You Drop?, 62 REVUE HELLlNIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 1 (2009).
7. Robert W. Staiger, Report on the International Trade Regime Jbr the International Task
Force on Global Public Goods (2004),
http://www.dartmouth.edu/-rstaiger/global.public.goods.paper.020504.pdf.
8. In accordance with "Environment Poverty Law", environment protection is related to human
rights, inter alia, the living condition. This issue will be discussed in detail in Part V.3 of this article.
See infra Part V, Sect. 3.
9. See WAYNE M. MORRISON & RACHEL TANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS R42510,
CHINA'S RARE EARTH INDUSTRY AND EXPORT REGIME: ECONOMIC AND TRADE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 9 (2012). Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-Tech Co., is the largest producer in China. See
Stock Profile China Northern Rare Earth Group High-Tech Co Ltd, REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=6001 11.SS (last visited Jul.18, 2016).
Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-Tech Co. was renamed as China Northern Rare Earth Hi-Tech Co.
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directly related to the application of the Panel's recommendations. Lastly, the
article restates that the standard of the law in the China-Rare Earths case should be
updated and the Panel's discretion on the approach shall be confined.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE RARE EARTHS INDUSTRY
Rare earths are a set of fifteen chemical elements in the periodic table.' 0
Actually, they are not rare but relatively abundant in the Earth's crust." However,
it is rare to find them in quantities significant enough to support economic mineral
development. Rare earths have both market value and national security
implications. 13
On the one hand, rare earths are important.14 Rare earth precious metals are
important to a variety of United States commercial industries. Rare earth products
relate to our daily life. Rare earth metals are used to produce your iPhone and
laptop.' 5  Rare earths make up a key part of your hybrid and conventional
automobiles.' 6 They make your house lighting work in a more energy-efficient
manner. 1 Rare earths are also used in the oil and gas industry, advanced
electronics, chemicals, medical equipment, "as well as [in the] U.S. defense
industries that produce various weapon systems."' 8 For instance, high purity
beryllium, one rare earth metal, possesses "unique properties that make it
indispensable in many of today's critical U.S. defense systems, including sensors,
missiles and satellites, avionics, and nuclear weapons."' 9 The exhibit below
illustrates the broad application of rare earths elements.
10. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 1 2.3.
11. Hobart King, REE - Rare Earth Elements and their Uses, GEOLOGY,
http://geology.com/articles/rare-earth-elements/ (last visited Jul. 12, 2016).
12. Rare Earth Elements, RARE ELEMENT RESOURCES,
http://www.rareelementresources.com/rare-earth-elements#.VxVfjmOMBmA (last visited Apr.12,
2016).
13. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 33.
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY
SUMMARIES 2015, 128-29 (2015), http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2015/mcs2015.pdf.
15. Renee Cho, Rare Earth Metals: Will We Have Enough?, STATE OF THE PLANET (Sept. 12,
2012), http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2012/09/19/rare-earth-metals-will-we-have-enough/.
16. Id.
17. Applications, RARE EARTH TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCE,
http://www.rareearthtechalliance.com/Applications (last visited Oct. 9 2016).
18. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at Summary.
19. VALERIE BAILEY GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41744, RARE EARTH ELEMENTS IN
NATIONAL DEFENSE: BACKGROUND, OVERSIGHT ISSUES, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 21 (2013).
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Exhibit 1: The Many Uses ofRare Earths20 Source: Congressional Research
Service
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As illustrated by Congressional Research Service exhibit above, the United
States Congress attempted to pass The National Strategic and Critical Minerals
Production Act of 2013.21 This makes it clear that some rare earth elements are
both strategic and critical to the United States' economic and national security and
manufacturing competitiveness.
22On the other hand, the mining and production of rare earths is hazardous,
and some countries like the United States and Australia have stopped domestic
20. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 4.
21. National Strategic and Critical Minerals Production Act of 2013 (H.R. 761), HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, http://naturalresources.house.gov/legislation/hr761/ (last visited
Oct. 9, 2016).
22. Tim Maughan, The Dystopian Lake Filled by the World's Tech Lust, BBC: FUTURE (Apr. 2,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150402-the-worst-place-on-earth.
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production. 23 The production starts with mining crude ore, which in turn is milled
into fine powder. 2 4 "In order to separate the valuable rare earth metals from the
rest of the ore, this powder is floated on water to which chemicals are added."25
"Flotation creates large waste streams, . . . which lead to large ponds called
'impoundment areas."' 26 According to the Institute for the Analysis of Global
Security (IAGS), "China produced over 130,000 metric tons of rare earth elements
in 2008."27 Rare earth production yields 1.2 billion to 1.6 billion cubic meters of
waste gases per year, and 9.8 million cubic meters of hazardous waste water.2 8
"These tailings contain toxic substances including radioactive uranium and
thorium, fluorides, sulphites, acids, and heavy metals, and constitute a major
environmental health risk." 2 9 "Rare earth element ores tend to contain a range of
different metals in their structure, including aluminum, arsenic, barium, beryllium,
cadmium, cobalt, copper, lead, manganese, and zinc." 3 0 Further, "some reagents or
heavy metals, such as cyanide and mercury, are valuable for use." 1 All three
environmental mediums the air, the water, and the soil, are so damaged.32
China learned both the environmental harms caused by the industry and the
importance of the resource.3 3 In order to begin campaigning to "rationally utili[ze]
[the] rare earth resource," China started regulating the rare earths industry in the
2000s, including through the use of trade controls. 34 Japan, the European Union,
and the United States, which were the complainants, contended that the regulations
were against the trade rules and brought China's trade regulatory measures to the
WTO in 2012.3s Subsequently, the Dispute Settlement Body established the
China-Rare Earths case.3 6
A. Facts of the China-Rare Earths Case
The environmental burden is critical to the rare earth industry and this case.
23. Bill Krist & Samuel Benka, Rare Earths: An Important Wake Up Call, AMERICA'S TRADE
POLICY (Sept. 24, 2013), http://americastradepolicy.com/rare-earths-an-important-wake-up-
call/#.VsM5-grl2w [hereinafter America's Trade Policy].
24. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 117.151.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Environmental Costs ofRefineries, MIT: MISSION 2016 STRATEGIC MINERAL MANAGEMENT,
http://web.mit.edu/ 2.000/www/m2016/finalwebsite/problems/refining.html (last visited Jul. 12, 2016).
28. Id.
29. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 117.151.
30. Environmental Costs ofRefineries, supra note 27.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, SITUATION AND POLICIES OF
CHINA'S RARE EARTH INDUSTRY (2010) [hereinafter STATE COUNCIL WHITE PAPER],
http://english.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043156.htm.
34. Id. at pt. 1, 111.
35. Obama Announces WTO Case Against China Over Rare Earths, CNN (Mar. 13, 2012),
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/13/world/asia/china-rare-earths-case/.
36. China-Rare Earths Case, supra note 1.
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The black market and stockpiling made the issue controversial. The hazard
transfer from rich countries to developing countries could be a critical issue to be
considered by the WTO Panel.
1. Traditional Leading Rare Earths Producers Stopped Market Contribution
Australia39 and the United States40 were the main producers of rare earths.
According to the Australian Government research report on rare earth deposits, 4 1
Australia produced 18,735 tons in 1985.42 From the mid-1960s through the 1980s,
the United States' Molycorp's Mountain Pass mine was "world's dominant source
of rare earth oxides"; however, both nearly stopped rare earths production in
2000s.43
China, the respondent in the China-Rare Earths case, is the only state that
increased its annual production about ten times from 16,500 tons to 135,000
tones."According to the China Rare Earths White Paper, China claimed it is not
proportional or sustainable that it provides more than 90% of market supplies with
its total 23% deposit of the world, even if the data might be different than that
supplied by complainant.45 However, it is also true that there are many other
international rare earth mines according to various government research reports. 46
Exhibit 2
Companies Nation
Molycorp's Mountain Pass Deposit The U.S.
37. Saurav Jha, China's Rare Earths Advantage, THE DIPLOMAT (April 29, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinas-rare-earths-advantage/.
38. See generally JENNIFER CLAPP, TOXIC TRANSFER, THE TRANSFER OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
FROM RICH TO POOR COUNTRIES (1" ed. 2001).
39. Dean M. Hoatson et al., The major rare-earth-element deposits of Australia: geological
setting, exploration, and resources, GEOSCIENCE AUSTRALIA V (2011),
http://www.ga.gov.au/corporatedata/71820/CompleteReport.pdf.
40. GRASSO, supra note 19, at 16.
41. Hoatson et al., supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. America's Trade Policy, supra note 23.
44. James B. Hedrick, Rare Earths, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (2004),
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rareearths/740494.pdf (at table 8, it shows China
produced 16,500 in 1990); see also U.S GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES
2011, at 19, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2011/mcs2011.pdf (China mined 140,000 tons
in 2009).
45. THE STATE COUNCIL, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, CHINA RARE EARTHS WHITE
PAPER 2 (2011) http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/gqbps/Document/1435492/1435492_1.htm (last visited
Dec.10, 2015).
46. Michael Mazza et al., Ensuring Japan's Critical Resource Security: Case Study in Rare
Earths Elements and natural Gas Supplies, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 1, 4-10 (2013),
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/-ensuring-japans-critical-resource-security-case-
studies-in-rare-earth-element-and-natural-gas-supplies_ 80131600240.pdf.
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U.S. Rare Earths The U.S.
Great Western Minerals Group(GWMG)
Canada
[Heavy Rare Earths Deposits]
Avalon Rare Metals
Canada
[Heavy Rare Earths Deposits]
The Lynas Corp. Australia
[light rare earths]
Nolans Bore. Australia
Dubbo Zirconia. Australia
Steenkampskraal (SKK) S. Africa
Rare Earth Extraction Co. Ltd. of Stellenbosch S. Africa
Eastern Coast Brazil
Domng Pao Vietnam
Kazakhstan National Mining Co. -
Kazatomprom Kazakhstan
But not limited to the above
Top 7 RE CorpS47  Bottom last 5 RE Corps48
Source: CRS R41347 Source: Ensuring Japan's Critical Resource
Security: Case Study in Rare Earth Elements and
natural Gas Supplies
China became the dominant seller of rare earths, and produced 97.3% of the
output of rare earths for the international community because of "preferential
policies by the Chinese government and "lax environmental standards." 49 This lax
environmental standard quickly enabled China to become a dominant, low-cost
producer of rare earths by the late 1990s.5 0 China realized that the situation was
47. MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41347, RARE EARTH ELEMENTS: THE GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAIN 12, 19 (2013).
48. See Mazza et al., supra note 46.
49. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 1.
50. Id.
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not sustainable.5
2. Stockpiling Smuggling Goods Holding "the Fate" of Global Producers
Rare earths smuggling has been a serious issue in China for decades. 52 The
respondent in China-Rare Earths case raised that measures in dispute served to
crack down on smuggling. 53  The rare earths smuggling related to the
"governmentally-promoted foreign stockpiling" issue was raised in the case.54
Smuggling hurts international rare earths producers. Business Insider
reported that "the fate of debt-ridden U.S. rare earth miner Molycorp rests on
China's efforts to crack down on networks that smuggled as much as 40,000 tons
of the vital technology metals out of the country last year, driving down global
prices."5 This also implies that smuggled rare earths from China, represent a
significant share of the global rare earths market.56
According to both China Business News, about 20,000 tons of rare earths
were smuggled from China in 2008, which was estimated to have accounted for
one third of the total volume of rare earths leaving China that year. This smuggling
is often the main reason behind the discrepancies between the official statistics and
the actual data of rare earth production and exports in China.
However, the rare earth deposits are often scattered under farmers' assigned
land, and rare earths are highly precious in value.58 It is not necessary to hold a
license for "illegal extraction."59 There is no trespass, which could be used against
those farmers. As the state news agency reported, it was hard to control stealings6
because a farmer might seldom be accused of such a wrongdoing for digging soil
from his or her own land.6 1
Japan, a complainant in China -Rare Earths case, imports more than 80% of
China's rare earths exports annually. 62  As reported for both concerns of the
51. See Mazza et al., supra note 46.
52. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 11.
53. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 117.412.
54. Id. 1|7.431.
55. David Stanway, The Fate of Global Rare Earth Miners Rests on a China Smuggling
Crackdown, REUTERS (Jul. 8, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-fate-of-global-rare-earth-
miners-rests-on-china-smuggling-crackdown-2015-7.
56. See generally MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 15.
57. Id. at 11.
58. See generally, Terbium, METALPRICES.COM,
https://www.metalprices.com/metal/terbium/terbium-metal-ex-china (Last visited Nov. 5, 2016); see
generally, Chris Lo, The False Monopoly, China and the Rare Earths Trade, MINING-
TECHNOLOGY.COM (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.mining-technology.com/features/featurethe-false-
monopoly-china-and-the-rare-earths-trade-4646712/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2016).
59. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 1 7.512.
60. Zhongguo Jiang Jixu Jiada Xituhangye Weifa Weigui Xingwei Daji Lidu [China will
Continue to Put More Effort to Crackdown the Illegal Rare Earths], XINHUA (Aug.10, 2014),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2014-08/10/c_126852328.htm.
61. Id.
62. Mazza et al., supra note 46, at 5.
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depleted natural resource and securing the supply, Japan has been stockpiling rare
earths from both legal and black markets. 63  According to BBC News, Japan
imports from about 30% of the black market for rare earths,64 a market where
smuggling rare earths is about 20% cheaper. 6 5 Illegal mining stimulated by
smuggling has prevailed all over the countryside in China.6 6 This illegal mining
presented a way to make a quick fortune when the illegally-mined rare earths ores
were sold in the black market. In the 2000s, rare earths mining was heavily
exploited in accordance with US congress report. This caused damage to both
the main producers and the environment. 68 China stated that countering the black
market was one of the reasons behind China's Administration of Import and
Export License Certificates; stating, "in the face of this illegal demand, China must
also control at the border what quantities of the rare earth products that are
exported and determine whether their origin is legal or illegal."69
While China has made efforts to curb the smuggling of rare earth metals as
much as possible, Japan and its major companies have aligned to stockpile the
smuggled goods from the black market.70 The governmentally-promoted foreign
stockpiling of smuggled rare earths activity and speculation, might be the cause of
action of China at issue. Arguably, not often does a complainant come to the WTO
for a judgment without clean hands.
3. Not a Price Hike, but Showing the Price of Rare Earths is Sensitive to
Environmental Costs
i) Rare earths supply did not in fact affect international buyers; "The Chinese
Ministry of Commerce announced export quotas of about 30,000 mt for 2011 and
were established at 31,438 mt. for 2012 and 2013. Actual Chinese rare earth
exports were closer to 13,000 mt in 2012 because of lower demand."7 1 In other
words, China's export quota oversupplied the international market demand by
about 2 to 3 times. There is no reason this would cause the price hike since the
balance between supply and demand was not tipped.
ii) When it comes to the price issue, the fact is that costs for rare earth
elements were probably depressed.72 It was also possibly not a fair market for the
following reasons.
63. TIMOTHY P. HANUSA, THE LIGHTEST METALS: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FROM LITHIUM
TO CALCIUM 64 (2015); Paul Mason, Rare earth: The New Great Game, BBC (Nov.18, 2009),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2009/l1/rareearththe new great game.html.
64. Paul Mason, supra note 63.
65. Ribenren de Xitu Zhan: Zousi Zhongguo Xitu Bi Zhengchang Jiage Di 20% [Japanese Rare
Earths War: Smuggling Chinese Rare is 20% Cheaper], XINHUA (Jul.10, 2012),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-07/10/c_123392633.htm.
66. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 11.
67. Id. at 11-12 (explaining the term "overheated").
68. Id.
69. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.421.
70. Mazza et al., supra note 62; Paul Mason, supra note 63.
71. HUMPHRIES, supra note 47, at 13.
72. Mazza et al., supra note 62; Paul Mason, supra note 63.
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First, China did not have a good negotiating position for a fair price.
Economically, if a company is defined as a "dominant player with a monopoly,"
the seller or buyer must have complete control of the entire supply of goods or of a
service in a certain area or market.73  Domestically, there had been "price wars
among the smaller suppliers in China." 74  Small local companies could not
withhold their position while negotiations were ongoing.75 On the other hand,
international rare earths buyers either had huge amounts of the stockpiled goods,
had black market supplies available, and/or their own deposits, as a backup plan.76
Furthermore, international buyers could secure long-term supply contracts with
non-Chinese companies as alternative suppliers.7 7
Secondly, while the price hiking might not exist in fact, a temporary price
restoration to levels seen in the 1990s may be occurring as we speak. 8  The
increase of the rare earths price during the purported period, between 2005 and
2009, was about 300% from $4000 to $12,000 per ton.7 9 However, when looking
over the history, there was a similar but much higher 500% increase during the
late-1980's to the early-1990's. 8 0 During this period the price rose from $2000 to
$10,000 per ton.81  Research shows that Molycorp was required to pay its
environmental costs due at that time, 82 e.g., Molycorp was required to clean up the
spills in the desert.8 3 Similarly, "rare earths enterprises in China face[d] significant
costs in compl[iance] with the listed environment requirements," including tax and
"ecological recovery" deposit. 84
The two events revealed that the rare earths industry is sensitive to
environmental costs. The measure in dispute was not the real cause.
73. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 111 (2008) http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.
74. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 13.
75. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 11 ("In order to maximize profits, these small companies
often ignored safety and environmental regulations and fiercely competed with each other for export
deals.").
76. Id.
77. Steve Mackowski, Why the Siemens-Molycorp Rare Earths Contract is a Sector Game-
changer, INVESTORINTEL, (May 20, 2015), http://investorintel.com/technology-metals-intel/why-the-
siemens-molycorp-rare-earths-contract-is-a-sector-game-changer; Kotaro Itsuki, Rare Earths Producers
Outside China Turn to Long-term Contracts, NIKKEI, (Dec.16, 2014),
http://asia.nikkei.com/Markets/Commodities/Rare-earths-producers-outside-China-tum-to-long-term-
contracts; John W. Miller, Molycorp Struggles to Survive Rare-Earths Bubble, WALL ST. J. (May 31,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/molycorp-struggles-to-survive-rare-earths-bubble-1433110948.
78. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2013, at 128 (2013),
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2013/mcs2013.pdf; Matt Gowing, 2011 Rare Earth
Industry Update: We Remain Bullish, MACKIE RESEARCH CAPITAL CORP. 10 (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://www.ggg.gl/userfiles/file/Broker ResearchReports/Rare_EarthMackieIndustryUpdate.pdf.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 3.
83. Id.
84. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 1 7.558, 7.561.
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Exhibit 3
Source: Mackie Research Capital Corporation 8
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Exhibit 486 Rare Earths Price $/Kg from 1979 to 2009
85. Gowing, supra note 79.
86. DENG WEI, Guoji Jingyan Ji Dui Zhongguo Xitu DingJia Quan De Qishi [CHINA RARE
EARTHS SHOULD LEARN FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES HOW TO NEGOTIATE THE PRICE]
(2011),
http://thesis.cei.gov.cn/modules/ShowDoc.aspx?DocGUID=82c4ld2el5f0417fa47c714db46708fI (last
visited Dec. 12, 2016).
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Exhibit 5 International Producers Production Share
Source: US Trade Policy8 7
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The charts above show that the drop of the price is correlated with the
withdrawals of non-Chinese rare earths producers from the market and the
occurrence of "preferential policies by the Chinese government and lax
environmental standards" until 2005.'" After China adopted similar environmental
measures there was a temporary price increase. 89 This correlation shows the
87. America's Trade Policy, supra note 23.
88. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at Summary.
89. Gowing, supra note 79; see also James B. Hedrick, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, RARE
EARTHS MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES: RARE EARTHS 129 (Jan. 2010),
ffil: 1979-2009.**W*±thQ*A*40 (*,ft,: X5t/-4rr)
4t
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sensitive relationship between the price of rare earths, the environmental policy,
and the environmental costs in this industry.
In sum, both the facts and logic raise doubt that there actually was a hike
caused by the alleged policy of the respondent after 2010. The statistics of the
sample were manipulated. The environmental sensitivity of the rare earth industry
was the real cause of the price increase. 90
4. The Rare Earths Environmental Hazards Transferred to Developing
Countries
Rare earth companies face stricter regulations nowadays because of
environmental pollution during their mining, extracting, and in the production of
natural resources. The toxic elements and the hazardous waste could also threaten
human, animal and plant life. Both social reaction and environmental
responsibilities are relevant to the China-Rare Earths case, and are in part why
WTO contracting members stopped or reduced contributions to the rare earths
market.9 '
The U.S. Molycorp92 and Australian Lynas 93 were both global leading
producers in rare earth production; however, both stopped domestic production as
a result of either environment regulations or the shifting of the environmental
burden to a third country.94
Australian Lynas Corp. also shifted its operation to Malaysia in 2012, but the
on-stream operation was delayed mainly because Malaysians disagreed over the
disposal of the rare earth production's radioactive waste.9 5  According to the
agreement, Lynas and Siemens formed a joint venture for the manufacturing of
magnets used in wind turbine generators. 6 Lynas (45% stake) provided raw
material to Siemens (55% stake) from their Mt. Weld mine in Australia.9 7 Lynas
began processing the rare earth concentrate at its Malaysian processing facility in
November of 2012.98 After a long and contentious approval process with the
Malaysian government, there were ongoing concerns in Malaysia over the proper
disposal of thorium, which was contained in mineral deposits produced alongside
the rare earth elements. 99 Malaysian protesters are currently pursuing a court
action in their country to get the plant shut down.' 00 One of the issues involved is
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare earths/mcs-2010-raree.pdf.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. GRASSO, supra note 19, at 16.
93. Hoatson et al., supra note 39.
94. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 2lEd Crooks, Molycorp to start China rare earth
exports, FIN. TIMES, (Mar.12, 2012), https://next.ft.com/content/96d95eee-6a09-1 lel-a26e-
00144feabdcO.
95. GRASSO, supra note 19, at 18.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Cecilia Jamasmie, Lynas Gets Malaysian Rare Earths Plant Going, MINING.COM, (Nov. 30,
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what would happen to the radioactive waste produced by the plant. Apparently, it
cannot be sent back to Australia.'o' The hazardous waste is harmful to the
environment, but also to humans and animals.1 02
Regarding Molycorp, the Congressional Research report states that
When the Mountain Pass Mine in the United States was operating at full
capacity in the 1990s, it produced as much as 850 gallons of salty
wastewater per minute, which also contained radioactive thorium and
uranium. The hazardous materials built up as scale inside the pipe that
delivered the wastewater to evaporation ponds 11 miles away. Several
times in the 1990s, cleaning operations caused the pipeline to burst,
spilling hazardous waste into the desert. Molycorp, then a unit of the oil
company Unocal, was ordered by the state of California to clean up the
waste. In 2002, the already struggling Molycorp ran out of space to
store its waste and failed to secure a permit to build a new storage
facility. As a result, the mine shut down.1 03
Molycorp shipped mine ores to the facilities in China for production.104
According to the business restructure, Molycorp acquired Neo Materials
Technology, Inc., which is a Toronto-based firm. 05 The company was renamed as
Molycorp Canada, which processes rare earths in China. 0 6
The burden of taking on 97% of world rare earth production caused China to
allow hazardous waste dumps that harmed the environment as well as humans and
animals. 0 7
B. The Impact to the Environment, Human and Animal Health, and Plants in
China
As reported by the China-Rare Earths Panel, "the mining and production of
rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum have caused grave harm to the environment
and to the life and health of humans, animals, and plants in China." los The Panel
admitted the following findings, which were conducted by the third party experts
both from the U.S. and the EU.'0 9
2012), http://www.mining.com/lynas-gets-malaysian-rare-earths-plant-going-78460/.
101. GRASSO, supra note 19, at 18. ("There are ongoing concerns in Malaysia over the proper
disposal of thorium."); Protests against Lynas Plant, THE AUSTRALIAN (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/thousands-of-people-protested-lynas-rare-
earths-plant-iin-malaysia/story-e6frg9df-1226282229085 (Thousands of people protested Lynas rare
earths plant in Malaysia) (Lynas insisted the plant is safe and that "any radioactive waste it will produce
will only be low-level and not harmful to human health.").
102. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2.3.4(7.1).
103. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 21.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 17.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15; China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 7.3.2.3.4(7.1).
108. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2.3.4(7.1).
109. See China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 1 7.150 (the Panel admitted the third
party's reports).
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1. The Harm of Mining and Production of Rare Earths
Rare earths production causes grave harm to environment. Rare earth
production starts with the mining of crude ore.o The ore needs to be milled into
fine powder for separating the valuable rare earth metals from the rest of the ore."1 !
This powder is floated on water to which chemicals are added.1 12 Flotation creates
large waste streams, which lead to large ponds called impoundment areas.
These tailings contain toxic substances including radioactive substances including
uranium and thorium, fluorides, sulphites, acids, and heavy metals and constitute a
major environmental health risk.11 4 Rock stockpiles, tailing ponds, and dams may
pollute groundwater and rainwater, affecting humans, animals, and plants in the
areas. 115
The Guardian investigated and found one of the ponds, "lacks a proper lining
and for the past 20 years its toxic contents have been seeping into groundwater,
according to villagers and state media reports. It is trickling towards the nearby
Yellow River, a major drinking water source for much of northern China."" 6
Rare earths also pollute air due to toxic and radioactive dust from the tailings
and waste rock stockpiles." 7 The pollution might last a long time after the mining
if not adequately cleaned up or tailings and stockpiles remain." 8 Research on "the
plants and soil of the Bayan Obo area, where the world's largest rare earths mine is
located, showed that radioactivity was 32 times higher in plants and 1.7 times
higher in soil."" 9 Studies also found that "61.8 tons of radioactive dust is emitted
each year as a result of the milling of the ores." 20
Rare earth separation and refining through a process called saponification
produces further wastewater.1 21 Studies have found that "the entire rare earth
refining industry in China annually produces approximately 20,000 to 25,000 tons
of wastewater, containing toxic ammonia nitrogen concentrations ranging between
300mg/L and 5000 mg/L."l22
2. The Impact of Tungsten and Molybdenum Production
The tungsten and molybdenum industry entails significant environmental
110. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2.3.3.1(7.3).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Jonathan Kaiman, Rare Earth Mining in China: the Bleak Social and Environmental Costs,
THE GUARDIAN, (Mar.20, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/rare-earth-mining-
china-social-environmental-costs.
117. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2.3.3.1(7.4).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 33, 17.3.2.3.3.1(7.5).
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risks; "[e]very year, 2.2 million cubic meters of solid waste are dumped into rivers
by tungsten ore processors; in addition, dozens of tons of arsenicum are discharged
with the wastewater from producing tungsten alloys/materials." 2 3 Heavy metals
pollute local rivers and threaten human, animals, and plants life. 124
3. Threats to Human and Animal Health
Rare earth radioactive elements could also threaten human, animals, and plant
life. Thorium causes cancers of the lungs and pancreas, as well as leukemia.' 25
The rare earth elements themselves also have a negative impact on the human heart
and lungs.1 2 6 Inhalation of lutetium creates lesions in the lungs.1 27 The use of
gadolinium increases the risk of skin diseases.1 2 8 Chronic exposure to lanthanum
may affect the central nervous system.1 29
Research findings by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament and
in a 2012 Study by the United States' Environmental Protection Agency,13 0
showed that "in areas near the mines, plants grow more slowly, flower poorly, and
bear bad fruits or no fruits at all; animals get sick and humans suffer from bone and
chest illnesses."' 31 For example, according to the Guardian, "[fi]n the 1990s, when
China's rare earths production kicked into full gear, [Wang Jianguo's] sheep died
and his cabbage crops withered. Most of his neighbors have moved away. Seven
have died of cancer. His teeth have grown yellow and crooked; they jut out at
strange angles from blackened gums."l32
4. Illegal Extraction Causes Harm
Illegal extraction and exploration has caused more environmental harm
because the "environmental prevention safeguards were circumvented.1 33  The
illegal extraction by miners without a license has prevailed across China.1 34 Illegal
miners are unlikely to clean-up following their operations and are unlikely to
execute an eco-recovery plan. 135 The potential for environmental damage is cause
for concern.
123. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note, 117.3.2.3.3.1(7.4).
124. Id
125. Id.
126. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2.3.3.1(7.5).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, T 7.3.2.3.3.1(7.3).
131. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 117.3.2.3.3.1(7.4).
132. Jonathan Kaiman, supra note 117.
133. PRC STATE COUNCIL, Situation and Policies of China's Rare Earth Industry, at 10, 19 (June
2012), http://treo.typepad.com/files/situation-and-policies-of-chinas-rare-earth-industry.pdf
134. Id.
135. Guotu Bu: Xitu CaikuangZheng Suojian Chuyu Huanbao Kaolv (± :1 A ilEMA
i fq 94-t ) [Homeland Department: Rare Earths Mining Licenses Revoking Due to
Environmental Issue], WIlVi [XINHUA] (Sept. 27, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2012-
09/27/c 113234656.htm.
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C. China's Ongoing Environmental Policy and Rare Earth Industry
Consolidation
China revoked mining licenses to counter the deteriorating environmental
conditions.' 36  According to Xinhua News, China issued more than two million
mining permits in 1980."' By 2012, the mining permits were revoked to one
hundred and ten thousand across China.' 3 8  The rare earth mining permits were
also reduced through industry consolidation.1 39
China has consolidated thousands of rare earth mines.1 40 The "overheated
rare earth production in China during the 1990s and the early-2000s generated a
fragmented industry with thousands of mines, many engaging in reckless mining
and illicit production."' 4 1 However, in 2006, China began to exercise total-amount
control over the exploitation of rare earths.1 4 2  In 2007, the government
incorporated the production of rare earths into national management by mandatory
planning.1 43 In 2008, the state issued the National Plan for Mineral Resources 44
In 2011, China issued the China State Council Opinion on Rare Earth Industry
Sustainable Development.14 5 The opinion states that the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology must counter the issues regarding the sustainable
development of the mining, the acute pollution and severe environmental harms,
and build a healthy market by balancing the supply and demand.1 4 6
As the China-Rare Earths Panel noticed, China had "a comprehensive
conservation policy."' 47 To avoid depletion of the "exhaustible rare earth
resources," China applied "extraction and production caps and enforcement actions
which were designed to manage the extraction and supply of the rare earth
resources through a conservation policy." 48 At the same time, China increased
export fees and domestic taxes to reimburse the environmental costs and harm
caused by the industry.1 49  Regarding the "governmentally-promoted foreign
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 11.
142. Id. at 12.
143. PRC STATE COUNCIL, Situation and Policies of China's Rare Earth Industry 17, (June 2012),
http://treo.typepad.com/files/situation-and-policies-of-chinas-rare-earth-industry.pdf
144. Id.
145. PRC STATE COUNCIL, Guidelines on Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of
the Rare Earth Industry (2011), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-05/19/content_ 1866997.htm.
146. Situation and Policies of China's Rare Earth Industry, supra note 144, at 4, 8.
147. Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten, and Molybdemum, ¶ 5.2.2(5.2), WTO Doc. WT/DS431/ABR; WT/DS432/AB/R;
WT/DS433/AB/R (July 8, 2014), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList-1I 26459&CurrentCatalogueldindex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEn
glishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.
148. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 7.6.2.2.2(7.10).
149. Bill Butcher, WTO Open Trade Rules and Domestic Environmental Protection Policies: a
Balancing Approach, in ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND GREEN FISCAL REFORM 75-77 (Larry
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stockpiling" issue, China placed export quotas to limit the annual export
amount.15 0 At last in 2010, China had started issuing export licenses in order to
crack down on the smuggling of goods in the black market.' 5 1 The policy and
regulations are as a whole interconnected to serve the conservation goals and the
environmental protection objective.
D. Summary
In short, the importance of the rare earth materials relates to the smuggling,
stockpiling and conservation. The environmental burden shifted to the respondent
was overlooked, but caused alarming harm to the health of humans, animals, and
plants without proper compensation.
III. THE CHINA-RARE EARTHS CASE AND ART XX (B) AND (G)
EXEMPTIONS
Japan, the European Union, and the US challenged the respondent's
"sustainable and sound development of the rare earth industry."l5 2 China raised
GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) as defenses, namely, protection of health of humans,
animals, and plants, and conservation of depleting natural resources.' 5 3
A. The WTO Dispute in a Nutshell
Japan, the European Union, and the United States brought this dispute before
the WTO and argued that three measures were not in conformity with trade rules:
export duties, export quotas, and export licenses to companies on rare earths,
molybdenum, and tungsten.1 54
The three issues discussed were respectively (1) whether China's export
duties on rare earths, molybdenum, and tungsten violated Paragraph 11.3 of
Chinese Accession Protocol; (2) whether the administration and allocation of
export quotas on rare earths and molybdenum by China violated Paragraphs 5.1
and 1.2 of Part I of the Chinese Accession Protocol; and (3) whether the use of
export quotas on rare earths, molybdenum, and tungsten by China violated Article
XI:I of the GATT and Paragraph 1.2 of Part I of the China's Accession Protocol.'
However, as noticed by scholars, parties primarily contended the issue on the
export quotas issue on rare earths' 5 6 whether the measure, violating GATT Art. XI:
Kreiser ed., 2014).
150. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 117.6.2.2.3.5(7.1).
151. Id. at 117.6.3.1(7.7).
152. SEVERAL OPINIONS OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON PROMOTING THE SUSTAINABLE AND
HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT OF THE RARE EARTH INDUSTRY,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspxlib=law&id=8741 &CGid= (last visited Jul. 12, 2016).
153. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 117.3.2(7.1).
154. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 11 2.3(2.1).
155. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, If 3.1.
156. Raj Bhala et al., WTO Case Review 2014, 32 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 497, 562 (2015)
(discussing Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/ABIR, WT/DS433/AB/R in Part B).
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I, could be justified under GATT Art. XX exemptions (b) and (g), respectively, for
protection of humans, animals and plant life, and conservation of exhaustible
natural resources.15 7
B. Severe Environmental Issue Justified China to Invoke GATTArt. XX (b)
and (g)
There are important differences between the circumstances of the China-Raw
Materials case'5 and the China-Rare Earths case. In contrast to the "heavily
oriented slant against exports" seen in China-Raw Materials, the China-Rare
Earths trade measures were part of a consolidated policy, which significantly
tightened the production caps, set stricter emission standards, and included higher
resource taxes.1 59  The measures were designed to protect the environment,
preserve resources, and promote the sustainable development of the rare earths
sector. 160
Because of the differences, the dissenting panelist in China-Rare Earths
found that, in light of the Preamble of the WTO Agreement, which embodies the
purpose and objective of the WTO, the fundamental importance of the flexibilities
provided in GATT Art. XX, Art. XXI, Art. XXIV and Art. XVIII(C) is
incontrovertible. 161 "These provisions strike a balance between the policy space
governments enjoy pursuing legitimate objectives and their obligations under the
GATT 1994"162 with good causes listed. The report further states, "therefore, the
dissenting Panelist concluded that unless China explicitly gave up its right to
invoke Art. XX of GATT 1994 which it did not, the general exception provisions
of the GATT 1994 are available to China to justify a violation."' 6 3 China invoked
the GATT Art. XX, allowing the Rare Earths case to be reviewed under GATT
Art. XX exemptions (b) and (g).1 64
IV. GATT ART. XX (B) AND (G) LAW REVIEW
In general, if a government has a good reason for violating the most-favored
nation (MFN) of GATT Art. 116 or national treatment of Art. III,166 the
157. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2(7.1).
158. China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, hereafter China-
Raw Materials. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds394_e.htm.
159. BUTCHER, supra note 150, at 75-77.
160. Id.
161. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2.2.8.4(7.5).
162. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2.2.8.4(7.5).
163. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.3.2.2.5(7.1).
164. McRae, infra note 203.
165. GATT ART. I. GENERAL MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT (MFN) (1947), is a principle
of trade. (Grant someone a special favor (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products)
and you have to do the same for all other WTO members),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/bookspe/gatt ai e/artle.pdf.
166. GATT ART. Ill. NATIONAL TREATMENT ON INTERNAL TAXATION AND REGULATION (1947),
(National treatment is a principle of trade which requires the imported and locally-produced goods shall
be treated equally - at least after the foreign goods have entered the market of a member state.),
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government may be able to defend the measure by qualifying for one of the
exceptions in GATT Article XX.167 Two exceptions are most applicable to
environmental policy: Art. XX (b) for measures "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life" and XX (g) for measures "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."1 68 Both exceptions are
subject to the requirement in the Art. XX chapeau that "such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade."1 69
A. Art. XX (b): "Necessary to Protect Human, Animal or Plants Life or
Health"
First, the "necessary" test entails not only the goals of the policy in dispute,
but rather whether the means cause discrimination.7 o As explained in US -
Gasoline,'7 1 the Panel held that "it was not the necessity of the policy goal that was
to be examined, but whether or not it was necessary that imported gasoline be
effectively prevented from benefiting from the same sale condition." 72
Second, necessity was explained, in EC-Tariff Preferences, that "a
'necessary' measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of
'indispensable' than to the opposite pole of simply 'making a contribution to."'
73
The Panel reviewed the effects of the drug arrangements in this report revealing
that the product coverage under the drug arrangements decreased by 31% from
1999 through 2001.174 Given that the benefits under the drug arrangements
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/gatt ai e/art3_e.pdf.
167. GATT ART. Ill. GENERAL EXCEPTIONS (1947), ("Subject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures."),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/bookspe/gattai e/art2Oe.pdf.
168. Id. ("(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . . (g) relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption."),
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/booksp_egatt ai e/art2Oe.pdf.
169. Steve Chamovitz, A New WTO Paradigm for Trade and Environment, 11 S.Y.B.IL. 15, 20-21
(2007). (quoting GATT Art. XX.) ("Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade . . ." nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures.)
170. Panel Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO
Doc. WT/DS2/R § 3.40 (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US - Gasoline Panel Report].
171. US - Gasoline Panel Report supra note 171, at § 6.10.
172. Id.
173. Panel Report, European Communities - Conditions on Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/R § 7.2 (Dec. 1, 2003).
174. Id.
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themselves were decreasing, the Panel could not come to the conclusion that the
drug arrangements were "necessary." 7 5 Regarding the "making a contribution to"
test, Brazil- Retreaded Tyres1 76 emphasized that a panel might conduct either a
quantitative or qualitative analysis of the contribution of a measure to the
achievement of its objective.17 7  The "weighing and balancing" was a "holistic
operation" that involved putting all the variables of the equation together and
evaluating them in relation to each other after having examined them individually
in order to reach an overall judgment. 178
Third, the alternative measure has to be reasonably available.' 79 In United
States- Section 337, the Panel wished to make it clear that the party invoking
Article XX had the obligation to choose a "reasonably available", least trade
restrictive, GATT-consistent measure.1 8 0
Lastly, the "burden of persuasion" is lower under Art. XX (b).' 8 ' The
Appellate Body stated that "it would be more deferential when human [life and]
health was at stake, and less so when WTO Members were pursuing other
regulatory objectives mentioned in the body of the Art XX."' 82
B. Art. XX (g): "[R]elating to" Conservation ofExhaustible Natural
Resources Plus "Made Effective in Conjunction with"
The "relating to" standard first requires that the measures should be more than
an "incidental or inadvertent connection" to the policy objectives.'8 3  The
175. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
1994, 1 869,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/analyticindex e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
176. Panel Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc.
WT/DS332/R §§ 4.8-4.15 (June 12, 2007) [hereafter Brazil- Retreaded Tyres],
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/casese/ds332_e.htm.
177. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
1994, 11 898,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic index e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
178. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
1994, 1 909,
https://www.wto.org/english/res e/bookspe/analytic indexe/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
179. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
1994, ¶ 905,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/booksp_e/analyticindex e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
180. Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, Environment, Trade, and The WTO Constraint: Bop Till
You Drop?, 62 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 21 (2009); THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND
PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994, 1J1 904-08,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/analytic-index e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
181. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
1994, ¶ 852,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic index e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
182. Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, Environment, Trade, and The WTO Constraint: Bop Till
You Drop?, 62 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 30 (2009).
183. Appellate Panel Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R § 3.40 (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US - Gasoline Appellate
Panel Report].
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Appellate Body interpreted "relating to" in US - Gasoline as whether the United
States baseline establishment rules were appropriately regarded as "primarily
aimed at" the conservation of natural resources within the meaning of the Art. XX
(g).1 84  The Appellate Body emphasized a merely incidental or inadvertent
connection will not suffice.' 8 5
Meanwhile, Art. XX (g) requires that a measure in compliance shall "make
effective in conjunctive with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."
For example, in US- Gasoline, the phrase "made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic product or consumption" under the Art. XX(g) was
regarded a "requirement of 'even-handedness."' 1 86 The Appellate Body, in US-
Shrimp, held that the United States measure at issue justified under the Art. XX(g),
in principle, because Section 609 was an "even-handed" measure. 8 7
C. Chapeau of the Art. XX: Not "Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination"
or "Disguised Restriction on International Trade"
The legal precedent provided by Guide to WTO Law and Practice'8 8 shows
that the Appellate Body interpreted the chapeau of Art. XX and described the
nature and purpose of Art. XX as a balance of rights and duties. 8 9
In the scope of the environmental issue, based on US- Gasoline, the Appellate
Body analyzed Art. XX's environmental protection measure, "Art. XX of the
General Agreement contains provisions designed to permit important state
interests, including the protection of human health, as well as the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources." 90 Indeed, both the Preamble to the WTO
Agreement and Decision on Trade and Environment show specific
acknowledgement of the importance of coordinating policies on trade and the
environment.' 9' However, the assessment needs to follow a two-tier test. First,
whether the measure in dispute is under Art. XX(g); and second, further appraisal
of the measure is under the chapeau of Art. XX.1 92
184. Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, Environment, Trade, and The WTO Constraint: Bop Till
You Drop?, 62 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 29 (2009); THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND
PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994, 1 941,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/analyticindex e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
185. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.5.3(7.5).
186. US - Gasoline Appellate Panel Report, supra note 184, at 21.
187. Id.
188. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
1994, 1 844,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/bookspe/analytic indexe/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
189. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
1994, 1 844,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/booksp e/analytic index e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article2OClb.
190. US - Gasoline Appellate Panel Report, supra note 171, at 30.
191. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
1994, 1 847,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic index e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
192. THE GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
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To assess whether the measure is an "arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination", the same condition prevails.' 93 In US-Shrimp,' 94 the United States
measure at issue was contemplated for being against the spirit of the chapeau of
Art. XX. Specifically, while the U.S. was in its right to implement policies to
"protect human, animal, and plant life" under Art. XX, those measures could not
have an "intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions of
other govermnents." 95 The United States excluded the shrimp from its market
solely because they had been caught in waters of countries that had not been
certified by the United States.' 9 6 In EC-Tariff the Panel similarly was not satisfied
with the drug arrangements, which intentionally excluded Iran, which was in the
same or similar condition as Pakistan. 19  In contrast, the Panel, in Brazil-
Retreaded Tyres, determined that the discrimination arising from the MERCOSUR
exemption was not "a priori unreasonable" or capricious because of Art. XXIV of
GATT that permitted preferential treatments for members.' 9 8
Furthermore, "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" and "disguised
restriction on international trade" were regarded as related concepts.' The kinds
of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular
measure amounts to 'arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination' may also be taken
into account in determining the presence of a 'disguised restriction' on
international trade." 200 Put in another way, a measure that is found as a disguised
restriction on international trade will be regarded as arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.
Scholars, concerned with the standard adopted in US-Gasoline, pointed out
that "the Appellate Body sought to give substantive content to the chapeau to Art.
XX." 2 0 1 The Appellate Body rejected the idea that a 'disguised restriction' was
limited to 'unannounced' restrictions and stated that the 'fundamental theme' of
the chapeau was of 'avoiding abuse or illegitimate use' of the exemptions in Art.
1994, 11 847-50,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/analytic_indexe/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb.
193. Id. at 1.849.
194. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp, [hereinafter US-Shrimp],
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Nov. 21, 2001),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/casese/ds58_e.htm (last visited Jul.22, 2016).
195. Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
1119, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [ hereinafter US-Shrimp Report by the Appellate Body].
196. The Guide to WTO Law and Practice: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, at 20,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/analytic index e/gattl994_07_e.htm#article20Clb (last
visited Feb. 16, 2016).
197. Panel Report, European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries 17.232, WT/DS246/R (DEC. 1, 2003).
198. Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ VII.48, WT/DS332/R
(Jun. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil -Retreated Tyres Report of the Panel].
199. Id. at 1 VII.9.
200. WTO, supra note 198, at 24.
201. Donald M. McRae, Trade and The Environment: The Development of WTO, 9 Otago L. Rev.
221, 233 (1998).
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XX.202 "It looked to see whether there were other less trade restrictive or less
203discriminatory means available" as the Art. XX (b) "necessary" test requires.
The new standard here nullifies the nature and purpose of Art. XX as a
balance of rights and duties of a member state; "In doing so , it has made a
significant change to GATT law and made environmental exceptions to trading
obligations extremely difficult to establish." 204 The "'disguised restriction on
international trade' test is indistinguishable from the test that applied under Art.
XX (b)."205 The new standard rendered the rewriting of Art. XX (g) became more
stringent than any version of the "primarily aimed at test" that was previously
adopted.206 The chapeau of Art. XX "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" test
here was so modified as the "necessary" test plus the "disguised restriction on
international trade" standard.207 The "hybrid standard" test in Art. XX exemptions
(b) and (g) makes it"next to impossible" for state environmental measures to ever
meet the requirements of Art. XX (g). 208
V. CHINA-RARE EARTHS DIVERGING FROM THE LEGAL PRECEDEND
The China-Rare Earths case could hardly be regarded consistent with Art.
XX (b) and (g) legal precedent. 209 The Panel exercised its discretion to preclude
the "actual effects" assessment.2 10 The "actual effects" assessment was used in EC-
Tariff Preferences and/or in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres to conduct either a quantitative
or qualitative analysis of the contribution of the measure to the achievement of its
objective 2 1  Rather, it focused only on the design and structure of the policy and its
textual analysis in China-Rare Earths.212
Because the parties primarily contended on the export quotas issue of rare
earths and applied the law on tungsten, and molybdenum at issue in same
manner, 213 this article, to avoid the repetition, selects the primary contention on the
export quota on rare earths for the analysis.
A. The Application of the Law
China invoked both GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) exemptions. 214  This
202. US - Gasoline Appellate Panel Report, supra note 184, at 25.
203. McRae, supra note 205, at 233.
204. Id.
205. McRae, supra note 205, at 234.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.4.1.3.
210. Id. at 17.5.3.4.
211. EC- Tariff Preferences, supra note 200, at 1 IV.13; Brazil -Retreated Tyres Report of the
Panel, supra note 201, at I IV.121.
212. Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten, and Molybdenum, 1 5.105, WT/DS433/AB/R (Aug. 7, 2014) [hereinafter China-Rare Earths
Appellate Body Report].
213. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3.
214. Id. at 117.3.2.
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subsection will analyze the law that the Panel applied to the China-Rare Earths
case.
1. GATT Art. XX(b) Was not Applied
As the law has been reviewed, GATT Art. XX (b) requires the measures in
dispute to be demonstrated as "necessary" means to achieve the protection of
human, animal or plant life. 215 However, the China-Rare Earths case was not
decided upon the Art. XX (b) legal basis discussed in previous cases, but rather
based on China's Accession Protocol.2 1 6
2. GATT Art. XX (g) "Relating to" Test
For a measure to be justified under Article XX (g), the measure at issue must
(i) "relate to" the "conservation" of an "exhaustible natural resource", and (ii) be
"made effective" "in conjunction" with "restrictions" on "domestic production or
consumption." 217 The Panel was of the view that a measure's compliance with Art.
XX (g) could be determined only on the basis of a holistic assessment of whether
the challenged measure relates to the conservation of rare earths, tungsten, or
molybdenum and is made effective in conjunction with domestic restrictions on
211
consumption or production.
Furthermore, the Panel set the precondition that "any conservation-related
burden must be imposed even-handedly on foreign and domestic users." 2 19 The
even-handedness standard was employed to decide the relationship between the
measures and the conservation of rare earths and to examine the effect of "made in
effect in conjunction with" domestic restrictions.220
a. "Relating to" the Conservation
At first, the Panel studied the "conservation" of an "exhaustible natural
resource." 221 The Panel did not opine on the "exhaustible natural resource" issue,
but focused on "conservation. 222 After China raised domestic extraction quotas,
production quotas and then export quotas, 223 the Panel accepted that China had a
comprehensive conservation policy to protect the depleting exhaustible rare earths
22including extraction caps, production caps and enforcement actions.224 Second, the
Panel turned to the relationship between the measures and the conservation of rare
215. Id. at 17.3.2.3. (Art. XX General Exemptions: (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health).
216. China-Rare Earths Appellate Body Report, supra note 214,115.34.
217. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at I 7.5.
218. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at I 7.5.3.3.
219. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 117.6.2.
220. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 17.5.3.3.
221. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 17.6.2.2.1.
222. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at ¶ 7.6.2.2.2.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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earths, stating that it must be "substantial," "close and real." 225 The Panel thought
that there was no need to evaluate the actual effects or that there was no need to
decide in quantitative or qualitative terms precisely what level of the contribution a
challenged measure has made to conservation objective.226 The Panel decided to
move to textual analysis and found the design and architecture did not relate to
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 227 Further, the Panel concluded that
some documents relating to China's quota measures made reference to
conservation goals while others referred to the industry policy. 228 Therefore, there
is no basis for concluding the measures were related to the conservation goal.229
The key finding here, according to the Panel, was that the export quota had no
limiting effect on the domestic consumers. 230 The Panel considered that extraction
caps or production quota provided incentives for illegal production to satisfy the
unmet demand. 23' Lastly, the Panel applied the export quota to domestic
consumers and found no equal restriction effect on domestic consumers. 23 2 The
Panel concluded that the export quota measure was applied unequally. 233
b. "Made Effective in Conjunction with" and "Even-handed" Judgment
The Panel examined the restriction effects on domestic quotas of extraction
and production and concluded that it was not clear whether the quota was capable
of having a limiting effect.234 The Panel additionally reasoned that the tax rewards
on resources could also have the counter-acting effect of restricting domestic
production,235 although they served a policy purpose.236
Finally, the Panel recalled that production and extraction quota, access
regulations, resources tax, and environmental regulations were imposed on
domestic and foreign users equally, while the export quota was imposed
exclusively on foreign users. 237 Because China did not impose any limits on
domestic consumption or a tax that applied exclusively to domestic users, it was
not balanced or "even-handed." 238
c. "Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination" or "Disguised Restriction on
International Trade"
The Panel concluded that the export quota measure failed the chapeau of Art.
225. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 117.6.2.2.3.
226. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 117.6.2.2.3.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 17.6.2.2.3.5.
231. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 117.6.2.2.3.4.
232. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 17.6.2.2.3.6.
233. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 17.6.2.2.3.4.
234. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 17.6.2.3.2.3.
235. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 17.6.2.3.2.5.
236. Id.
237. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 17.6.2.3.3.4.
238. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 117.6.2.4.
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XX arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination test on the standard of "a disguised
restriction."2 3 9 The Panel stated it was possible that the export quotas contributed
to price differences even if there were unfilled quotas leftover.2 40 Also, the Panel
found export quotas affected only foreign users, which was inconsistent with the
"even-handed" requirement. 24' Furthermore, due to the unfilled quota, "it will
vary the next year quantitative limit and cause uncertainty."2 42 Apparently, the
Panel adopted the "hybrid standard" in the case. The Panel looked to the WTO-
consistent alternative under GATT Art. XX (b), and found that China had
alternatives available to achieve its objective.2 43 The Panel concluded that the
export quota measure was "a disguised restriction." 244
B. Appellate Body is "Rhetorical, " but Certainty at Issue
Regarding issues of the Panel's approach used in the case, the Appellate Body
at first concluded it wrong that the appellant understood "the Panel 'must' examine
the design and structure of the measure" as the Panel "limited upon" it at issue. 24 5
However, the Appellate Body rhetorically 246 stated that the Panel did not err in
"focusing on" the "design and structure of the measure."2 47 Additionally, the Panel
is not required to examine "actual effects" in assessing whether a measure "relates
to" conservation within the meaning of Art. XX (g), but Panels are not precluded
from doing so either.24 8
With the respect, the Panel might exercise their discretion to a certain extent,
but it adds uncertainty when the Panel should examine the "actual effects" as EC-
Tariff Preferences did.249 There is no guidance on this issue. Also, the difference
between "limited on" and "focusing on" in the Appellate Body's statement is
equally confusing. 250
The Appellate Body agreed with the appellant that the phrase "made effective
in conjunction with" to be interpreted as "even-handed" was wrong in this case; 251
"Nevertheless we have found that this error of the Panel does not taint the
remainder of its interpretation of Art. XX (g)." 252 However, when looking at the
Panel's judgment, "equal" or "even-handed" are the key standards for various
239. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 117.3.2.3.3.
240. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 117.6.3.1.4.
241. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 1¶7.6.3.1.6.
242. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at ¶ 7.6.3.1.3.
243. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at 117.6.3.3.
244. Id.
245. China-Rare Earths Appellate Body Report, supra note 214, 1 5.108.
246. Steve Charnovitz, A New WTO Paradigm For Trade and The Environment, 11 S.Y.B.I.L. 15,
8 (2007).
247. China-Rare Earths Appellate Body Report, supra note 214, 1 5.114.
248. Id. at 115.113.
249. EC- Tariff Preferences, supra note 218, at ¶ VI.2.-3.
250. China-Rare Earths Appellate Body Report, supra note 214.
251. Id. at15.127.
252. Id. at 1 5.247.
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judgments. 253 If the "even-handed" standard was rejected, it would have effected
almost every conclusion in the key parts of 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8 of the Panel
report.254 The Appellate Body did not provide an explanation of how the opinion
was reached in this regard.
C. Critiques: Barely the Panel put Rare Earths in the Four-square Box
For bringing the case under the discipline of trade, the Panel adopted several
strategies to serve the purpose.255 However, the strategies might raise issues of
WTO judgment.
First, the Panel's approach has undergone criticism. 2 56 As the Panel's report
has been reviewed, the Panel could not be satisfied unless and until no
"theoretical" exemption exists. 257 "Solely" based on the textual analysis, without
assessing actual effects, the Panel adventured a series of "theoretical judgments"
on export quotas, e.g., price distortion, 258 incentives of smuggling,25 9 and industry
relocation incentives.260 For instance, regarding industry relocation incentives, the
Panel even explicitly acknowledged no evidence of foreign direct investment
increases over five years since the measure was adopted.2 61 This approach could
be regarded as divergent from EC-Tariff Preferences and/or Brazil-Retreaded
Tires precedent regarding the honoring of the facts. 262
253. See China-Rare Earths Appellate Body Report, supra note 214 ("Even-handed" is the Art. XX
(g) decisive standard test applied in China-Rare Earths by the Panel in accordance with the China-Rare
Earths Panel Report at Section 7.5.2.3. The Panel made the judgment accordingly of a series of
arguments. For example, in 1 7.6.2.2. regarding "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption," the Panel was not convinced due to the "even-handed" test. The
rare earths extraction system is not even-handed. The rare earths production system is not even-handed.
The volume restriction and the domestic consumption cap are not even-handed. The resource export
tariff and resource tax are not even-handed, either. The Panel found the environmental requirement is
not even-handed. In sum, the Panel is not convinced that the tax, domestic cap, environmental
requirement cannot serve as a counterpart of the export restriction as "made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption").
254. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3.
255. Id.
256. PRC, supra note 150; infra note 269, professor Raj Bhala misused the 'necessity' test as a
conflation of Art.(b) and (g).
257. See China-Rare Earths Appellate Body Report, supra note 214, as stated by the Appellate
Body at para.5.118 of China-Rare Earths Appellate Body Report, "we find that the Panel did not err by
considering that it should focus on the design and structure of the export quotas in its assessment of
whether those measures relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources within the meaning
of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. In addition, we find that the Panel did not err in stating that 'the
analysis under subparagraph (g) does not require an evaluation of the actual effects of the concerned
measures'." Therefore, the Panel decided the case on the theoretical bases rather the "actual
assessments".
258. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.6.3.3.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Addendum to the Panel Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten, and Molybdenum, 1 VI (D)(40), WT/DS432/R/Add.1 (Mar. 26, 2014).
262. Panel Report, European Communities- Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences,
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Secondly, as this case was reviewed, the Panel employed Art. XX (b)
"necessity" after the "disguised restriction on international trade" hybrid standard
test to examine the quota in dispute under GATT Art. XX (g). 263 The test standard
is recognized as "next to impossible" by Professor Donald M. McRae.2 64 Put in
another way, China-Rare Earths was decided based on the stricter "hybrid
standard" test, which some scholars even opined that could be a misuse of law.
The conflation of the 'necessity' test linked to Art. XX (b) and pointed to
previous findings that the distinctions between the connecting words 'necessary'
and 'relating to' require different tests, and 'mixing of the different tests under Art.
XX (b) and Art. XX (g), absent of context, would result in an approach that ignores
the important distinctions between the various subparagraphs of Article XX 265
The law applied in China-Rare Earths was not only confusing, but also much
stricter.266 This standard directly affected the exemption granted by the Panel.
Third, it was arguable that while the Art. XX (b) issue of this case should
have been judged solely on the basis of Art XX (b) law. Instead, it was rejected on
a different basis, not the law of Art XX (b). 267 According to the Panel's report, the
environmental issues of the China-Rare Earths case were implicated under Art.
XX (g). 2 68 In so doing, the respondent had to bear a higher "burden of persuasion"
standard since Art. XX (g) issues would be less deferential than measures under
Art. XX (b) when human (life and) health was at stake. 2 69 The Appellate Body
admitted that measures under Art. XX (g) could be more likely to be considered
270
"disguised" to pursue other regulatory objectives in previous cases.
WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003); see Panel Report, Brazil- Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
¶ VII.48, WT/DS332/R (Jun. 12, 2007).
263. Bhala, infra note 267. See China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 7.6.3.1 (where
the Panel explicitly used "disguised restriction on international trade" standard rather "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" test. See China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 7.6.3.3 (the
Panel went back to WTO-consistent alternatives test which is generally used under Art. XX (b) for
"necessity" test. WTO, supra note 194, "It looked to see whether there were other less trade restrictive
or less discriminatory means available" in the similar way as Art. XX (b) "necessary" test requires).
264. Donald M. McRae, Trade and The Environment: The Development of WTO, 9 OTAGo L.
REv. 221, 234 (1998).
265. Raj Bhala et al., WTO Case Review 2014, 32 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 497, 568 (2015)
(discussing Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/ABIR, WT/DS433/AB/R in Part B).
266. "Stricter" means the "next to impossible" standard; McRae, supra note 205 for [The "hybrid
standard" test in Art. XX exemptions (b) and (g) makes it "next to impossible" for state environmental
measures to ever meet the requirements of Art. XX (g).]
267. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 1 8.1.1 (The Panel decided the case based on
the China's Accession Protocol at the issue of GATT Art. XX (b)).
268. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3 (the Panel focused on the GATT Art. XX (g)
after Art. (g) was decided upon the China's Accession Protocol.).
269. Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis, Environment, Trade, and The WTO Constraint: Bop Till
You Drop? 62 Rdvue Hell6nique de Droit International, 1-63 (2009).
270. Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (For instance, in the report on EC - Asbestos,
the AB confirmed that this was indeed the case "in this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the
preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-
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This is the Art. XX (b) issue granted and admitted by The Panel themselves,
"[t]hat [is] necessary to protect the environment or human, animal or plant life or
health would likely be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the WTO
Agreement." 2 7 1 They continued, "[s]uch a result could even rise to the level of
being manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 272
However, unlike EC-Asbestos273which was decided under Art. XX (b) for
"the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by Asbestos", the same
"well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by" rare earth production was
granted a judgment in accordance with the Art. XX (g).274 It is arguable that some
facts are distinguishable between the two cases, but the life-threatening and health
risks to humans and animals are equally important and, in China-Rare Earths,
proved much more grave. 275
VI. WTO TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT STANDARD WAITING FOR RESPONSE TO BOTH
ITS OBJECTIVES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL STANDARD LAWS
Beyond the issue regarding the applied Art. XX law in Rare Earths, the case
ruling contradicts both the objectives of the WTO and other broadly accepted
international principles in effect.
A. Self-contradiction of the WTO Trade and Environment Objective
The WTO's attention to the environment started early when the WTO was
established.276 The Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement states:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view toward raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment, a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand. As well as a view toward the expansion of the production of and trade in
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development. All of this while
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development. 277
threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibers. The value pursued is both vital and important in the
highest degree.") Id. at 172.
271. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, f 7.3.2.2.6.
272. Id.
273. VED P. NANDA ET AL., International Trade and the Environment, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 554 (2nd ed. 2013).
274. EC-Asbestos, WTO DISPUTE SETrLEMENT: ONE- PAGE CASE SUMMARIES,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/lpagesum e/dsl35sum e.pdf (In EC-Esbestos,
the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the ban was justified as an exception under Art. XX
(b)- necessary to protect human life or health).
275. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 11 7.3.2.2.2.1 (Harm arising from the mining
and production of the products at issue).
276. WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
277. Id. at 154, 162 (stating that "[a]ny State or separate customs territory possessing full
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The fundamental agreement allows members to adopt certain policies to
advance environmental protections and preserve the natural resources according to
their economic development needs. This WTO objective was embodied in various
case rulings. 2 7 8 In U.S.-Shrimp, the WTO Appellate Body interpreted the general
exceptions in GATT Art. XX and "famously stated that the Preamble 'informs' all
of the WTO trade agreements and explicitly acknowledges 'the objective of
sustainable development."' 279  In reference to this and other language in U.S.-
Shrimp, Professor John Jackson calls the decision a constitutional door opener for
approaches that require a broader perspective than just the four corners of the very
extensive GATT/WTO treaty language." 2 80
However, the Rare Earths case adopted the "hybrid standard" and "just the
four corners of the very extensive GATT/WTO treaty language." Therefore, the
conservation of exhaustible resources and the sustainable development objectives
might only theoretically exist in the WTO agreement. 2 81
B. The WTO is exclusively a "Market Access Rights Agency."
The established Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was dedicated
282to achieving a positive relationship between trade and environment. However,
about twenty years later, the commitment standard is disappointing. 283  The
committee work is based on two important principles. First, "if the committee does
identify problems, its solutions must continue to uphold the principles of the WTO
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in
this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be
agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral
Trade Agreements annexed thereto.").
278. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 278.
279. Steve Chamovitz, A New WTO Paradigm For Trade and The Environment, 11 S.Y.B.I.L. 15,
18(2007).
280. Id.
281. STEVE CHARNOVITZ, THE PATH OF WORLD TRADE LA WIN THE 21ST CENTURY 434 (2014).
282. The Committee on Trade and Environment ('regular' CTE), WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
I https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envire/wrkcommittee_e.htm (last visited Jul.15, 2016).
283. Compare Environmental and Regional Trade Agreements, OECD, 1-2 (2007),
https://www.oecd.org/env/38664937.pdf. (For instance, according to 2007 Executive Summary of
OECD, "the United States wanted to put trade and environmental issues in the Regional Trade
Agreements on an equal footing" while "trade and environment debates have traditionally seen
developing country negotiators cautious about incorporating environmental considerations into
multilateral trade agreements.") Members and Partners, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/. Japan, the U.S. and China are signatories of OECD.
The Committee on Trade and Environment ('Regular' CTE), WTO, I
(https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/envir-e/wrk-committee e.htm) (The WTO Committee on Trade
and Environment (CTE) was created since 1994). With Eric Neumayer, The WTO and the Environment:
Its Past Record is Better than Critics Believe, but the Future Outlook is Bleak, 4 Global Environmental
Policy 1, 6 (2004). "The WTO has done little to promote environmental protection so far and there is
little hope that this is likely to change in the future." See p. 1. "The CTE has not become a frontrunner
in triggering environmentally friendly reform of the multilateral trade regime, but a forum for rather
fruitless discussions."
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trading system."284 However, second,
The WTO is only competent to deal with trade. In other words, in
environmental issues its only task is to study questions that arise when
environmental policies have a significant impact on trade. The WTO is
not an environmental agency. Its members do not want it to intervene in
national or international environmental policies or to set environmental
standards. Other agencies that specialize in environmental issues are
better qualified to undertake those tasks. 285
After those related rulings, scholars point out that the WTO is now a "market
access rights agency." 2 86 This explains such a case that it is always a loss of the
environment when the health issues and other non-tradable interests conflict with
WTO trade.
C. Incompatibility with Standards ofInternational Laws and Human Rights
The pollution and living conditions issues are related to human rights. The
Art. XX (b) of "protection of human, animal, and plant life" was purported to be
consistent with the untradeable interests.2 87
As discussed above, the human, animal, and plant life issue might not give
enough consideration when the Panel reached the judgment. The fundamental
importance of the flexibilities provided in GATT Article XX is incontrovertible
according to the Preamble of the WTO Agreement.288 As admitted by the Panel,
the harms to human, animals, and plant life caused by rare earth production and
mining, are severe and shocking. 289 As the dissenting Panelist reasoned China
could "invoke Art. XX of the GATT 1994.",290 Following the logic of the evidence
permitted, the China-Rare Earths case was entitled to a review provided under
GATT Art. XX (b). 291 Nevertheless, the measures in dispute under Art. XX (b) of
"protection of human, animal, and plant life" were judged under an unequal basis,
not on the basis of GATT Art. XX, but on the basis of Protocol 11.3.292 As the
284. The Environment: A Specific Concern, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/bey2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
285. Id.
286. Steve Chamovitz, A New WTO Paradigm For Trade and The Environment, 11 S.Y.B.I.L.15,
35 (2007).
287. Rachel Harris and Gillian Moon, GATT Article XX and Human Rights: What Do We Know
from the First 20 Years? Melb. J. Int'l Law 432, 451 (2015). "Article XX is generally considered to
offer the best possibility of protection for a trade-affecting human rights measure."
288. China Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, at Il 7.3.2.2.8.3 ("The fundamental importance
of the flexibilities" provided in GATT Articles XX and XXI is "incontrovertible," "[i]n light of the
preamble of the WTO Agreement, which embodies the purpose and objective of the WTO.").
289. China Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3.
290. China Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3.
291. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 11 7.138 (separate opinion) ("Therefore, in my
view, unless China explicitly gave up its right to invoke Article XX of GATT 1994, which it did not,
the general exception provisions of the GATT 1994 are available to China to justify a violation . .
Art. XX (b) is not excluded.).
292. Id. 117.137 (separate opinion).
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report shows, in this case, the Panel was consistently "in difficulty" to be
persuaded at each and every point under Art. XX (g) due to the much higher
"burden of persuasion" standard placed on the respondent. 293 The case gives the
impression that the judgment of Art. XX (b) of "protection of human, animal, and
plant life" issue was manipulated via a legal bias. 294
From a broader perspective, the ruling was inconsistent with other
international legal standards. There is a broad recognition of the relationship
between environmental protection and human rights, inter alia, "Environmental
Poverty Law", poor people are more likely to suffer the consequences of
environmental pollution.295
This situation is true at both the international and national levels.
Internationally, poor nations tend to have more severe environmental problems
than wealthier nations. Examples of these problems are easy to identify. Air
pollution in Mexico and China is generally more severe than in France or
Australia.296
At the national level, e.g., "in 1994, President Clinton issued an executive
order calling on federal agencies to make certain that environmentally undesirable
activities do not disproportionately burden low-income or minority
communities."297
Whereas here, the WTO ignored other international standards and the shifted
environmental burden of rare earth mining and production. 298  The case
downplayed the human rights issues, and contradicted the international
environment concerns and the international community efforts for better living
conditions.
D. Summary
Therefore, the case decision can be questioned from the perspectives of other
international legal standards, inter alia, the human rights.
VII. THE EXPORT POLICY SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN ISOLATED FROM
THE COMPREHENSIVE POLICY
Beside of the problem that the Panel of China-Rare Earths adopted the
theoretical methodology at issue without "balancing and weighing" actual effects
of the measures in dispute, the Panel reviewed the rare earths conservation policy
separately one after another: (a) strict control of access to the rare earth industry;
293. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 11 7.91, 7.398, 7.433, 7.446, 7.483, 7.497,
7.510, 7.531, 7.544, 7.562, 7.566, 7.586, 7.638, 7.650, 7.662, 7.715, 7.746, 7.764, 7.791, 7.803, 7.817,
7.889, 7.917, 7.925, 7.929.
294. Id.
295. ARMIN ROSENCRANZ ET AL., THE PRINCIPLES, STRUCTURE, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 13 (1999),
https://www.ucar.edu/communications/gcip/m3elaw/m3pdf.pdf.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See generally China-Rare Earths Appellate Body Report, supra note 214.
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(b) taxation measures; (c) tackling harm to environment caused by mining and
production; (d) strict quantitative control of extraction and production and export
restriction; and (e) strict enforcement of laws and regulations relating to rare earth
industry.299 Scholars pointed out that "export policy should not be viewed in
isolation." 300 The export controls are embedded in a greater transformation of the
strategic rare earths industry."oi The respondent promoted "a broad set of
policies, including industry reorganization, resource conservation, and
environmental protection. ,302
This follow up study provides insights on how the respondent, a transitional
economy between a planned economy and market economy, has been conducting
its economic reform to achieve the rare earth industry reorganization, resource
conservation, and environmental protection "as a whole." 303  The first-hand
research was conducted at both the macroeconomic level and the microeconomic
level, respectively.
A. Macroeconomic Policy Review
At the macroeconomic level, it is important to understand the rare earth
industry reform under the transitional background of China's economy. Rare earth
industry reform was not able to take place alone, but through, and in concert with,
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform and the SOEs' ownership restructuring.
1. The Defendant is a Transitional Economy
China has been trying to obtain market economy status for numerous reasons.
Market economy status (MES), "has come to the top of the international agenda,
bringing heated discussions on whether or not China will soon be granted this
status." 304 China argues that its WTO accession documents foresee an automatic
acquisition of MES after December 11, 2016.305 Some other WTO members think
the text in question is subject to interpretation.306 For practical reasons, in the
negotiations of various agreements including those with the EU,307 the issue has
held state-owned enterprises (SOEs) investment 308 and market access. 309
299. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.369.
300. Jost Wiibbeke, Rare Earth Elements in China: Policies and Narratives of Reinventing an
Industry, 38 RESOURCES POLICY 384, 394 (2013).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. PRC STATE COUNCIL, supra note 134.
304. One Year to Go. The Debate Over China's Market Economy Status (MES) Heats Up 1
(2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/570453/EXPOIDA(2015)570453_EN.pdf.
305. Id.
306. Id
307. Id.
308. FRANCOIS GODEMENT & ANGELA STANZEL, THE EUROPEAN INTEREST IN AN INVESTMENT
TREATY WITH CHINA 7 (Feb. 2015),
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the europeaninterestinaninvestmenttreaty with china3
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China has been claiming that "it has reached a crucial period and reforms
have entered a tough stage." 3 '0 The new administration explicitly stated that it was
harder to reform when the policies affected the interested groups in China.3 1 1
Without this overall and continuous reform momentum, an industrial level policy
could hardly achieve its goals because of the interested groups affected.
2. Continuing SOEs Reform to Rebuild an Interest-Sharing Rare Earth
Industry Structure Between Local Governments and the Central
Government
Solving the smuggling issue in this case needs the support of local
governments; "In 2012, a year of transition in China's top leadership, how to
balance central and local interests may take priority." 312  The lack of local
government support partly contributed the chaos; "[o]verheated rare earth
production in China during the 1990s and the early 2000s generated a fragmented
industry with thousands of mines, many engaging in reckless mining and illicit." 313
The central government campaigned to close local small rare earth companies. 314
The closing affected both local governments' revenue and involved some officials'
personal interests.31 s Without local administrative support, the smuggling and
illegal exploitation will not stop. 3 16 Without a new sharing structure "to balance
central and local interests," the goal to protect the environment and/or to conserve
exhaustible natural resources will be hardly achievable. 317
Most large rare earth companies are state-owned enterprises (SOEs).3. The
309. EESC Against Granting Market Access to China, EUROPEAN ECON. AND Soc. COMM. (Jul.
14, 2016), http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.press-releases.40018.
310. China Must Stick to Direction of Reform, CHINA DAILY (Jun.5, 2012),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/05/content_608154.htm or
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-reform-idUSBRE82HO2420120318.
311. Gabriel Wildau, China's State-Owned Enterprise Reform Plans Face Compromise, Fin.
Times (Sept. 14, 2015), https://next.ft.com/content/5eeeb84a-5aaa- l le5-97e9-7fbf5e7177b
(explaining the new SOE reform 2015 shows the compromise to the interest groups).
312. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 15.
313. Id. at 12.
314. Id. at 15; see also Xitfi shingchan zhixi kaishi zhingzhi ( [Rare
Earth Production Order, Began a Crackdown], RtNMiN RiBAO HAIWAI BAN (XR B 1)
[PEOPLE'S DAILY] (Aug. 9, 2011) http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2011-08/09/content_1922128.htm.
315. $E dif L- bIIJiifE )T9i [Halfof the Illegal Rear Earths
Is Related to Interests of Government Officials according to the Industry Experts], XINHUA NEWS,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-08/1 1/c_126853478.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
316. ZHONGGUO JINGJI YU RIBEN QIYE 2015 NIAN BAIPISHU (t Eggg 02'II/20154 Gdi
*) [CHINA ECONOMY AND JAPANESE COMPANIES 2015 WHITE PAPER] 103 (2015),
http://www.cjcci.biz/publichtml/whitepaper/2015/400PCN.pdf [hereinafter CHINA-JAPAN WHITE
PAPER].
317. CHANG JIAN (' ) [CHANG JIAN], WOGU6 KUANGCHAN ZIYUAN CHORANG SHOUYi
GONGXIANG JlZHi YANJIO ( ) [MINERAL RESOURCES INTEREST
SHARING MECHANISM], Gu~JIA FAZHAN HE GAIGl WtIYUANHUI JINGJi TIZHi Y0 GUANLI YANJIO SUO
DE ( I $iT ±) [NAT'LDEV. & REFORM INST. ECON. SYS. &
MGMT. COMM.] (2014), http://www.china-reform.org/?content_554.html.
318. Chun-Wei Yap, China to Merge Rare-Earth Arms of Six State Metal Producers, WALL ST. J.,
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first round of SOE reform was started by Zhu RongJi in the 1990's.3 19 China's
SOE reform closed 60,000 state-owned enterprises from where forty million
people lost their jobs.32 0 It brought back the performance of the SOEs, but, the
SOEs, valued at$16 trillion in total, performed poorly, according to Bloomberg
News.321 China planned to continue the reform after this new administration
stepped-up in 2012.322
The impact of the continuing SOE Reform on the rare earth industry includes
both the new sharing structure to balance the interest between the central and the
local govemments, and the principle to stay at arm's length from the rare earth
companies.32 3 The former was to be achieved through the rare earth industry
consolidation of local companies.324 For keeping governments from directly
influencing companies, the reform allows more diverse equity ownership. 325 The
Guideline on SOE Reform 2015 (hereafter the Guideline) key points are as
follows: 326
First, State Asset Administration of China (SAAC) and local governments are
required to keep at an arm's length from the company daily decision-making by
following the modem corporate governing structure.32 7 SAAC shall change its
position accordingly from being the administrator of SOEs to being a
shareholder. 328
Secondly, the Guideline emphasizes the market function to achieve economic
efficiency. 329  The Guideline encourages SOEs to be listed as a whole 330 and
(May. 14, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-merge-rare-earth-arms-of-six-state-metal-
producers-1431607567 (showing they are state-owned).
319. China Leaders Consult Old Master Zhu Rongji Over Reform, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept.14,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-15/china-leaders-said-to-consult-old-master-
zhu-rongji-over-reform.
320. Id.
321. Id
322. See Gabriel Wildau, supra note 313.
323. NAT'L SCHOOL OF DEV., CHINA'S SOE REFORM: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (2015), http://en.nsd.edu.cn/article.asp?articleid=75 11; Xinhua, Mixed-Ownership Key to
SOE Reform: NDRC, CHINADAILY ASIA (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2015-09/14/content_15316352.html ("The intervention of the
government agencies is forbidden.").
324. JIAN, supra note 319.
325. Zhanggdng zhangydng, guowuyuan gudnyu shinhua gudydu qfyd gdigg de zhiddo yifian (4P
A . &#_49 gg' N -5-,9 ) [CPC Central Committee and State Council on
Deepening the Guidance ofState-Owned Enterprise Reform], XINHUA WANG (Vi* R) [XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY] (Sept. 13, 2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-09/13/c 111 6547305.htm
[hereinafter SOE Guideline] (highlighting in section (V), the reform plan emphasizes the transparency
of the company management through equity diversity.measure); China Released a New Round ofSOE
Reform Plan Sparked Heated Debate, BBC (Sept. 13, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2015/09/150913_china-guoqi.
326. SOE REFORM, supra note 325.
327. Id. § Ix.; WANG, supra note 327 ("[The] intervention by government agencies will be
forbidden.").
328. SOE REFORM, supra note 325, § Xiii.
329. Id. at § A.
132 VOL. 45:1
2016 WTO STANDARDS:GATT ART. XX IMPOSSIBLE EXEMPTIONS 133
through the market to liquidate the outdated sectors of large entities. The central
government shall focus on the administration of its assets and monitor its capital
gains.3 3 1
Third, the reduction of the SOE's state equity ownership and the increase of
private investors' involvement are directed to achieve the transparency of SOEs
decision-making. 332 The state shall retain a lion share of control only over the
industries that are related to the national security, economic stability and sensitive
areas.
333
3. Ownership Concentration and State Control over the Upstream of Rare
Earths Industry
First, the overall ownership structure of the international rare earth industry is
concentrated in upstream. 33 4  Hastings and Lynas hold the absolute control of
Australian rare earths, 335 while "Molycorp is the largest holder of rare earth
deposits outside of China."336
China started the concentration in 2006. " Concentrated companies could be
accountable for environmental damages and serve the purpose of conserving the
rare earth resources. The cleaning-up of rare earth pollution and eco-recovery
activites are costly. For example, Molycorp spilled in a desert in the 1990's. 33 It
took years for Chevron, the parent company, to clean up chemical contaminants.3 3 9
The respondent of the Rare Earths case required mining companies to make a
deposit for ecological recovery according to the Deposit for ecological recovery
requirements in Opinions on Enhancing the Ecological Protection and Restoration
of Mines 340 and Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the
Sustainable and Sound Development of the Rare Earth Industry.34 1 The
respondent further placed the standard on the emission of pollutants in the rare
330. See generally Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange,
SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, http://english.sse.com.cn/laws/framework/c/3978488.pdf (last visited
Dec. 17, 2016) (China has been allowing companies to partially list their units so long as they conform
to strict listing requirements on the stock markets either on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange).
331. SOE REFORM, supra note 325, §§ Xii, Xiii, and (Xv).
332. Id. §§ XIX, Xxiii.
333. Id. § V.
334. See AUSTRALIANRAREEARTHS.COM, http://www.australianrareearths.com/known-rees-
resources-reserves.html (last visited Feb.18, 2016).
335. World Rare Earth Elements Deposits by Country ex-China, AUSTRALIANRAREEARTHS.COM,
http://www.australianrareearths.com/images/global-reel.gif (last visited Jul. 17, 2016)); see also Lynas
Financial Report 9, ANNUAL REPORTS,.
http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/ASXLYC_2015.pdf
336. GRASSO, supra note 19, at 13.
337. PRC STATE COUNCIL, supra note 139.
338. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 13.
339. GRASSO, supra note 19, at 16.
340. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.556.
341. Id
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earth industry to reduce the harm to humans, animals and plants. 342 Companies in
the industry shall mandatorily make significant investments to meet those
standards.3 43 Besides the environmental protection purpose, consolidation helps
serve the conservation goals. It is practically easier to monitor fewer companies.
a. Horizontal Division: "5+1" Concentrated Rare Earths Industry Structure
The division of the central and local companies has been scheduled as
follows: China North Rare Earths takes control of the former Baogang Rare
Earths.344 China Minmetals Co, Chinalco, and CNMC are another three Central
SOEs in the South while Ganzhou Rare Earths, Jiangtong Rare Earths,
Guangcheng NonFerrous Metals and Xia'men Tungsten Co are local companies
holding the interests of the local natural resources on behalf of the local
governments. 345
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology designed that the six
companieS 346 shall functionally concentrate the local little mines of each region,
reduce the production for sustainability purpose, and protect the concerned
environments. 347
The six large groups have taken over seventy-seven rare earth mining permits
of the seventy-eight in total in China and consolidated seventy-seven of ninety-
nine smelting and refining enterprises by the end of 2015 as expected to complete
the consolidation mission.348
The rare earth resource is apparently sensitive to the respondent's security.
Pursuant to the SOE reform Guideline, the government would start loosening the
rare earth downstream industry control while the respondent maintains the higher
level of equity control over the upstream resources.349
342. EMISSION STANDARDS OF POLLUTANTS FROM RARE EARTHS INDUSTRY, PRC MINISTRY
ENVTL. PROTECTION. (2011),
http://english.mep.gov.cn/standards reports/standards/waterenvironment/Dischargestandard/201111/
W020110210366768105784.pdf.
343. PUI-KWAN TSE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CHINA'S RARE-EARTH INDUSTRY 9 (2011)
("Rare-earth producers will be required to meet the environmental emission standards; otherwise, they
will be shut down.").
344. See China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3.
345. Xit6 5+] Ndnbdi Gejsi yrXingching Hiis& sTKulng Reng Zhanjiu Bnbjingshdn (W±5+1
T i 1)[Rare Earths Industry 5+1 Architecture Instituted, But
Smuggling Goods Holds Half of Market], ZHONGGU6 ZHENGQUAN BAO GUAN (r iEAUE AMM)
[CHINA SEC. J.] (Aug.19, 2015), http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsxw/201408/t201408194485675.html.
346. The discrepancy of the number shows local governments compete for their local interests and
try to change the original design by the central government.
347. Dixing Jitudn Zhdo Zhanggud X 0Chnyd FAzh in xn Gdjd ()K M _ X PW
1%AlLVMfiW) [Big Companies Will Control the Rare Earths Industry], XINHUA ($fr$ 1)(Aug.10,
2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-08/10/c_1116194639.htm.
348. Xtt Hangy& Zh6ngh6 Tis6 Liu dA Jituan Niandi Winchdng Ch6ngzi (F6 Gii) (± AkM
R AA7 R MR)) [Rare Earths Consolidation accelerated, Six Groups shall be
Formed by the End of This Year], ZHONGGU6 ZHENGQUAN BAO GUAN (r MiiEEREEN ) [CHINA
SEC. J.] (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsxw/201508/t20150811 4774925.html.
349. The upstream resources are regarded as critical to the national security. GRASSO, supra note
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b. Vertical Separation: Dividing the Rare Earth Resources Companies from
Downstream Companies
The policy architecture design was illustrated via the reform of the largest rare
earth producer, Baogang Rare Earths.350
Inner Mongolia Baogang Rare Earths was a part of the Baogang Group, a
giant SOE in the northern China. Inner Mongolia Baogang Rare Earths was listed
in 1997 and changed its name to its current form on January 14, 2015.352 On
February 20th, 2014, China Security published a notice that the Inner Mongolia
Baogang Rare Earths and Inner Mongolia Baogang Steel Group (the other parallel
subsidiary of the Group) released their Development Plan. According to the
Plan, the latter shall own all the resources of the rare earths and steel ores and
concentrate the mining industry in the North,354  turning it into a resource
company. On the other hand, as prescribed in China Northern Rare Earths
High-Tech Co Article of Association Article 13, Inner Mongolia Baogang Rare
Earths, now called China Northern Rare Earths High-Tech Co (hereinafter China
Northern Rare Earths), shall focus on the application of the rare earths,
technologies development and shall concentrate on the local smaller companies.356
China Northern Rare Earths locates itself in the downstream of the chain.3 57
Therefore, the upstream resources and downstream application of resources
were divided vertically in the chain. The two companies would have different
equity ownership standards according to the Guideline.35 s
The new central and local interest sharing structure made local governments
21, at 22. (According to the SOE Reform, the state ownership shall be controlling as evidenced by the
data below).
350. Guanyu Neimenggu Baogang Ganglian Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yu Neimenggu Baogang Xitu
Gaokeji Gufen Youxian Gongsi Weilai Fazhan Zhanlue de Shishi Guihua [Development Plan of the
Implementation of the strategy of Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Union Co., Ltd and Inner Mongolia
Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi Tech Co., Ltd.], ZHONGGU6 ZHENGQUkN BlAO GUAN (9 Pi!EM11RAM
i) [CHINA SEC. J.] (Feb. 20, 2014), http://wo.cs.com.cn/html/2014-02/20/content_813393.htm?div--I
[hereinafter Development Plan].
351. Brief Introduction, BAOGANG GROUP, http://www.btsteel.com/web/index.html (last visited
Oct. 15, 2016).
352. Bdogang Xti 20 ri qi Gangming "B6ifang XtO'" (
[Baogang Rare Earths Renamed as China Northern Rare Earths], Zhonggu6 Zh~ngquhn Wing (P M
iiEfR) [CHINASTOCKS] (Jan.14, 2015),
http://ggjd.cnstock.com/company/scpggjd/tjd ggkx/201501/3310310.htm.
353. Development Plan, supra note 352.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. (China Northern Rare Earths shifts into downstream business as the Development Plan
indicates to focus on the application of the rare earths instead of the upstream mining.) China Northern
Rare Earth Group High-Tech Co. Ltd (6001Il.SS), REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=6001 1LSS (last visited Nov. 5, 2016);
Art. 12 Mission, focusing on the tech innovation and expand both domestic and international markets
358. See Development Plan, supra note 352.
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winners, e.g., the local government Inner Mongolia has 73.77% of equity in China
Northern Rare Earths' parent company.35 9 In the "5+1" structure, the local
governments further secured their interest share of resources as it shows below. 360
Jiangtong Rare Earths is in Sichuan Province. 3 6  The SOE Chinalco has been
in the Sichuan Province as well.362 The competition between the SOE Chinalco
and Jiangtong Sichuang was intense. 363 In 2014, Jiangtong acquired another five
local smaller companies to form a bigger group to fence off the SOE giant.364 The
local government explicitly declared their support for Jiangtong, in that the local
rare earth industry shall follow Jiangtong's leadership.6 So far, Jiangtong has not
been a part of the structure of the new "5+1" industry plan. 366 Nobody knows
whether its fate is to be a part of Chinalco or change the original "5+1" structure to
";5+2."
In reconciliation by the central government, the new design brought the
previous resource interest competitors and local governments to the shareholder
meeting table. 368 The recent SOE reform Guideline further involves more market
players including stock exchange regulators, institutional investors, private
investors, and professional firms to monitor the operation of companies. 369
Theoretically, local governments will no longer be able to extract as much as they
wanted for their own interests. Significant business plans would be decided by the
board after the shareholders meeting authorization.370 In so doing, the goal of the
conservation of the exhaustible resources could be finally achievable.
359. Northern Rare Earth (IdLL), CAPITAL STRUCTURE (izb,
http://www.reht.com/sitefiles/services/cms/page.aspx?s=1&n=7 (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
360. Zhongly Jiangtong , infra note 364.
361. Company Overview, JIANG TONG COPPER RARE EARTH Co., LTD.,
http://www.scjtxt.com/About/article-9-112_1.html (last visited Jul. 18, 2016).
362. Zh6ng 111 Jiang T6ng Chingduitdixi Sichuan Sh6ng Xit Zhdngh6 Hu6ydowbi Jidn N6ng (cp
l fi) 1 lJ II 'ifti 'ikVi f) [Zhonglv Jianglong Competition is Getting
Intensifying], XINHUA (#i#RI) (Mar. 28, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2014-
03/28/c_126327301_2.htm.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Zhongly Jiangtong, supra note 364.
367. Id.
368. Zh6nghua F6nmin G6nghdgu6 Huanjing Boh6 FA
[Environmental Protection Law of People's Republic of China], EU-China Envtl. Gov't Programme
arts. 13, 14 (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://www.ecegp.com/files/2/Environmental%20Protection%2Law/20of/2OPRC%202014.pdf
(unofficial translation).
369. SOE Reform, supra note 325, § Xvii.
370. Id § Vii.
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Exhibit 6: The SOE Local and Central Government Interest Sharing Structure371
State Councill
Seciaty of the Cental
Commission for
Disciplinespeton
SAC
SO I Non-SOEs 11#4h
Vatcbdog
The Stock Market
Su ms g
SOE' sAdnisators/ Involvement of SE Local Govement State Council [SASAC Instonal IinvestoI
Assemnt laingand Finncg sharehoklrs Ohather vest
371. See generally, Naughton, Berry, Top-Down Control: SASAC and the Persistence of State
Ownership in China, THE UNIV. OF NOTrINGHAM,
www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/sharedlevevents/. . /2006_JuneChinaNaughton.doc (last visited Nov.
5,2016).
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B. Microeconomic Level Case Study
Compared to the macroeconomic level reform, the company level changes
started much earlier. Inner Mongolia Baogang Rare Earths followed dozens of
acquisitions of local rare earths companies in 2012.372 The world's number one
rare earth producer, Inner Mongolia Baogang Rare Earths, was split into "China
Northern Rare Earths" and "Inner Mongolia BaoTou Steel Union." 373 Pursuant to
the later "5+1" plan and the vertical division.of the rare earth industry, Inner
Mongolia BaoTou Steel Union, a resource company, functioned to concentrate the
upstream local smaller mines of the northern region to reduce the production for
sustainability purposes and protect the environment at issue. 374 China Northern
Rare Earths continued with more equity acquisitions in the downstream.3 7 5
However, the two SOEs acquisition strategies were different.
The Comparison between China Northern Rare Earths and Inner Mongolia
BaoTou Steel Union:
1. Diversifying the Parent Companies Equity and Public Offerings3 7 6
Inner Mongolia Baogang Group, as the parent SOE company in the North,
had to follow the SOE Reform Guideline and made some accommodations
accordingly. The parent companies modified its equity ownership of the two listed
subsidiaries.37 It remained 38.92% of state ownership in China Northern Rare
Earths.3 7 8  However, Baotou Steel Union Co, the rare earth resource company,
increased its state ownership from 1.64% to 51.65%; by the third quarter there was
roughly another 3% increase as the exhibit below shows. 379
372. Bao Gang XTt Zh6nghe 12 Jia XTtil Qiye (l2* :titik) [inner Mongolia
Baogang Group Rare Took Over 12 Rare Earths Companies], ZHONGGU6 XINWtN (* PIM lV) [CHINA
NEWS] (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.chinanews.com/stock/2012/12-28/4445318.shtml.
373. Development Plan, supra note 352; see also China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3.
374. Big Companies Will Control the Rare Earths Industry, supra note 341.
375. Id.
376. "5+1", the 6 rare earths companies are listed. See infra note 387; see also Exhibit 7.
377. See generally, China Northern Rare Earths High Tech: 2014 Annual Reports, at 39, 41.;
China Northern Rare Earths High Tech: 2015 Quarter Reports at 2; China Northern Rare Earths High
Tech: 2016 midterm reports at 24; Baogang Steel Union: 2015 Ist Quarter Report at 5, 23, 26; Baogang
Steel Union: 2015 1 ' Quarter Report at 21.
378. CHINA NORTHERN RARE EARTHS (GROUP) HIGH-TECH Co., LTD. THIRD QUARTER REPORT
OF 2015 2 (2015).
http://www.sse.com.cn/assortment/stock/list/stockdetails/announcement/index.shtml?COMPANYCO
DE=6001 11 &productld=6001 11 &bt-%E5%85%A8%E9%83%A8&static=t.
379. INNER MONGOLIA BAOTOU STEEL UNION CO.,LTD MIDDLE TERM REPORT 21 (2015).
http://www.sse.com.cn/assortment/stock/list/stockdetails/announcement/index.shtml?COMPANYCO
DE=600111&productld=600111&bt=%E5%85%A8%E9%83%A8&static-t (lasted visited Nov. 22,
2015).
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Exhibit 7 Difference of the Equity Structure380
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange
China Northern Rare Earths38' BaoTou Steel Union Co 3 82
[Downstream] [Upstream]
State-Owned Equity 38.92% State-Owned Equity 54.66%
Hong Kong Jiaxin Co.,Ltd 9.07% Shanghai Lijiaying 4.78%[Foreign Investment] Trading Co
China Securities Finance 2.99% Shanghai Liumu
Corporation., Ltd Dingxiang 3.80%
Investment co
Central Huijin 1.64% Guohua Life 3.76%
Investment.,Ltd Insurance
ZOFUNDS Hua'An Investment
0.75% Hong Kong 2.56%
[Foreign Investor]
2. China Northern Rare Earths Subsidiaries and Branches Level Equity
Ownership Study
The companies in downstream equity structure even involved more
participation from private investors at the lower level. 3  In early 2014, Inner
Mongolia Baogang Rare Earths, currently China Northern Rare Earths,
consolidated another five local companies, but this time the company acquired
only 34% equity of the four subsidiaries and strategically bought 5% equity shares
from the last one. 384 The strategy was consistently embedded in the later issued
SOE reform Guideline.3 8 5
380. CHINA NORTHERN RARE EARTHS (GROUP) HIGH-TECH CO.,LTD THIRD QUARTER REPORT OF
2015 4 (2015).
http://www.sse.com.cn/assortment/stock/list/stockdetails/announcement/index.shtml?COMPANYCO
DE=6001 11 &productld=600l 111&bt-%E5%85%A8%E9%83%A8&static-t.
381. CHINA NORTHERN RARE EARTHS (GROUP) HIGH-TECH CO.,LTD THIRD QUARTER REPORT OF
2015 2 (2015).
http://www.sse.com.cn/assortment/stock/list/stockdetails/announcement/index.shtml?COMPANYCO
DE=6001 11 &productld=6001 l l&bt--%E5%85%A8%E9%83%A8&static=t.
382. INNER MONGOLIA BAOTOU STEEL UNION CO.,LTD THIRD QUARTER REPORT OF 2015 5
(2015).
http://www.sse.com.cn/assortment/stock/list/stockdetails/announcement/index.shtml?COMPANYCO
DE=600 Ill &productld=600l 11 &bt=%E5%85%A8%E9%83%A8&static-t.
383. Id. at 15.
384. Bao Gang Xt Jijng Zhinghd W Jid . Xt GangsT (NW III *i-:61V & ) [Inner
Mongolia Baogang Group Rare Takes Over Five Rare Earths Companies], ZHONGGU6 ZHINGQUAN
Bo GUAN (PMiUE* lilEARI) [CHINA SEC. J.] (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsxw/201412/t20141211_4587560.html.
385. The upstream rare earths resource is regarded as critical to national security where the art. 5, 1
3 specifies state to be the controlling shareholder. Xinthau (fr@), CPC CENT. COMMITTEE AND ST.
COUNCIL ON DEEPENING THE GUIDANCE OF ST.-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM (M*PAA Y
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As the diagram shows below, China Northern Rare Earths, a subsidiary
SOE, owns three branches of companies and four kinds of subsidiaries.386 The first
category contains four subsidiaries of 100% ownership; the second level of control
is 51% plus state ownership. 3 8 7  In those companies, the China Northern Rare
Earths has controlling voting power in board decisions.3 8 8  The third level of
control is the leveraging control through its voting power. 389  Within these
companies, China Northern Rare Earths owns more than 34% of equity.390 The
last category is the significant ownership; China Northern Rare Earths decreases
the equity ownership with the last six companies on the right end of the chart
below in the range between 10.2% and 5%.391 It implies that the private
ownership, including foreign investors, 392 will increase proportionally up to
95%.393
Exhibit 8: China North Rare Earths394
lJ (Aug. 24, 2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-
09/13/c 11 16547305.htn.
386. Northern Rare Earth (AtW5i), CAPITAL STRUCTURE (RSi1),
http://www.reht.com/sitefiles/services/cms/page.aspx?s=1 &n=7 (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
387. Northern Rare Earth (1Li ), CAPITAL STRUCTURE (1Ll:),
http://www.reht.com/sitefiles/services/cms/page.aspx?s=1 &n=7 (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
388. Northern Rare Earth (1L)Ri±), CAPITAL STRUCTURE (1L)V -± ),
http://www.reht.com/sitefiles/services/cms/page.aspx?s=1 &n=7 (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
389. Id.
390. Id.
3 9 1. Id.
392. Id. Due to the business scope severance between Baogang Group and China Northern Rare
Earths, China Northern Rare Earths High Tech Limited By Shares is in the downstream of the chain and
not related to the resources. Therefore, application of the rare earths does not fall in the prohibited
category rare earths mining according to China Foreign Investment Industries Categories p27. Also,
China encourages the JV business structure between China domestic companies with foreign investors
for technology updates and the industry advance.
393. Northern Rare Earth (LW:I), CAPITAL STRUCTURE (ILj:),
http://www.reht.com/sitefiles/services/cms/page.aspx?s=1 &n=7 (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
394. Northern Rare Earth (ItW ~i), CAPITAL STRUCTURE (IL3 i),
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As it is encouraged by the Guideline, the company is also listed with all of
its assets on the China Shanghai Exchange. 395  Reports of subsidiaries and
branches are accordingly required to be audited by third parties and be publically
available. These moves add the transparency of the market and reduce the
chance of local influences.
In sum, the central government, now one of the shareholders, shall
http://www.reht.com/sitefiles/services/cms/page.aspx?s=1&n=7 (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
395. Shanghai Stock Exchange (JFT1 9d Z ), Northern China Rare Earth (Group) Hi-Tech
Company 600 111 ( 600111), COMPANY OVERVIEW (&
http://www.sse.com.cn/assortment/stock/list/info/company/index.shtml?COMPANY_CODE=600 111
(last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
396. The information is public available at the stock exchanges, both Shanghai and Shenzhen
Exchange as note 371 shows.
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participate in the shareholder meeting to authorize it's planning. 397 The board shall
act on behalf of the shareholders to comply with the conservation policy of the
exhaustible rare earths and the environmental regulations.3 9 8
C. Strengthened Environmental Law and Regulations
The conservation plan includes the environmental requirements and its
enforcement actions. 399 The strengthened legal enforcement helps in achieving the
above purported goals. China's thirteenth 5-Year Plan indicates that local officials
shall not be immune from the environmental responsibility liability for negligence
and that a clean environment shall be a key indicator of the prescribed people's
living conditions.400 The Plan also encourages commercial companies to join in
the environmental recovery.4 0 ' The huge market amounts to 17 trillion Yuan.402
The state will commence its stricter monitoring system by involving non-state third
party participation to reform the current environmental administration structure.403
According to Xinhua News, the administration shall be more transparent.404 China
also modified its Environmental Law.405 Further, China legislators took two years
and issued China Clean Water Act on April 16, 2015.406
The tightened environmental regulations, public awareness, and third
party monitoring pushed local governments to be more willing to cooperate by
showing their due diligence efforts to avoid sanctions. Xinhua News first criticized
the Jiangxi Province which collected accumulative revenue of about one billion US
dollars from the local rare earth industry, but the pollution generated was found to
cost the local government thirty-eight billion RMB (6 billion USD) to clean up. 407
397. Companies Law of the People's Republic of China, CHINA.ORG.CN,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/govemment/207344.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
398. Id.
399. Panel Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and
Molybdenum, ¶ 7.490, WTO Doc. WT/DS433/R (March 26, 2014).
400. Xinthua (VlS*), OPEN OUR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT "THE MOST SERIOUS TIMES"
R1 19ff fif9" Fil ft ") (Nov. 11, 2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-
11/1l/c 11 17103672.htm.
401. Id. ("The government shall invest 1.7 trillion RMB for the environment recovery" and "it is a
good opportunity for the business in the sector").
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Xinthua (0-S*), supra note 402.
405. Polly Botsford, Climate Justice. China's 'Advanced' New Environmental Law, INT'L BAR
ASSOCIATION (March 22, 2016), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=6212b2ad-38f3-
4ec5-a42c-687f4d9el 076.
406. China Daily Info. Co., China Fights Pollution with New Clean Water Plan,
CHINADAILY.COM.CN, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-06/1 I/contentI 7579982.htm (last
updated June 11, 2014); Dunkan Hewitt, China Announces Ambitious Plan to Clean up its Water, Close
Down Polluting Factories, INT'L BUSINESS TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015, 10:20 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/china-announces-ambitious-plan-clean-its-water-close-down-polluting-
factories-1886320.
407. Xinthua (MSi4), DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND: RARE EARTH MINING PERMITS REDUCED FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS (F9 V11if: W i E4 t f J (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2012-09/27/c_1 13234656.htm.
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This means some local officials might lose their promotions or face sanctions when
the term is fully evaluated. 408 The large companies shall also be supervised and
evaluated accordingly. 409 The top directors of corporations and the company are
jointly liable to pollutions and environmental damages according to the China
Court. 4 1 0  The strict legal enforcement is a key to the comprehensive policy
reform.4 1 1
D. Summary
This study has revealed that the broad set of policies in the transitional
economy, as a whole, served the objectives of industry reorganization, resource
conservation, and environmental protections at both the macroeconomic level and
the microeconomic level. In the view of the scholars, the export policy should not
be viewed in isolation, and is in conformity with the findings.
E. Comments
Research shows that so far the current industry consolidation has been
making progress, but there are some concerns:
Most developing nations also lack the political stability and democratic
traditions that allow citizens to influence government policy. The
government and corporations of the developed world have a powerful
financial incentive to export hazardous or polluting industries to third
world pollution havens. The resulting health and environmental
problems then become the burden of the Third World host country. 412
The respondent has the same issue.4 13 The market might speculate on the failure of
China's current rare earth industry reform and conservation policy. There are
several key issues below:
First, the interest sharing architecture between the central state and local
governments might not work in reality. Particularly, the locally controlled rare
earth companies might advance the local priorities. The shareholders could also
have different goals. For instance, the local plan of Inner Mongolia, where China
Northern Rear Earths is located, requires that the rare earths industry shall grow
annually by 24% and its turnover shall reach 100 billion RMB by the end of
408. Jennifer Duggan, China's polluters to face large fines under law change, THEGUARDIAN
(Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/chinas-choice/2014/apr/25/china-
environment-law-fines-for-pollution.
409. Australian Rare Earths, supra note 336; Chapter II Supervision and Management,
CHINADAILY.cOM.cN, art. 22-24 (May 20, 2014), http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/trans/2014-
05/20/content_17522868_2.htm.
410. Pan Yingru, Strengthen Environmental Liability of Countermeasures (NIL
fE@)NJiffL), LOCAL COURT COLUMN ( (Oct. 25, 2015),
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2015/10/id/1732946.shtml.
411. Duggan, supra note 410.
412. ROSENCRANZ ET AL., supra note 297.
413. See Jonathan Kaiman, supra note 117.
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2020.414 The autonomous region wants to expand the usage of the industry for tax
revenue. 415 Local officials still have interests in the mining. The Rare Earths
Association claimed the consolidation became harder at the later phase due to the
local officials' interests involved.4 16 Since the reform was initiated in 2006,417 the
reform effort has lasted for ten years. Some issues, e.g., smuggling networks, have
only gotten worse. 41 8
Second, China vows to build a rule-of-law government by 2020,4'9 but not
a rule-of-law state as of yet. Although laws and regulations were promulgated for
these purposes, there are plenty of concerns of the effective enforcement. So far
there is no legal precedent regarding an official or SOE's company director being
punished due to the environmental issue, including the Jiangxi Province case,
which Xinhua News above criticized the Jinhui Company for causing 38 billion
RMB in environmental damages (six billion USD).4 20 In the most recent Supreme
Court of China case, the Supreme Court of China upheld the lower court's decision
of inflicting a 26 million USD penalty due to the environmental damage caused by
Jinhui Company, but there is no director to be punished for being jointly liable in
the verdict.4 2 '
Lastly, the rare earth deposits are scattered under farmers' assigned land
and the rare earths are highly precious in value. Some elements are much more
valuable than gold.42 2 Even though the seventy-seven of the ninety-nine licenses
now are owned by the "5+1" companies, it is not necessary to hold a license for
"the illegal extraction." 42 3  As the state news agency reported, it was hard to
prevent stealing and smuggling.424 The land is under farmers' use. Customarily, it
414. See Jiangxi Copper Aluminum Rival Sichuan Integration of Rare Earth is Getting Stronger
Smell of Gunpowder + #l] Jiyli IG 1)11t A E) I), ENERGY (PEl) (March 28,
2014) http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2014-03/28/c_126327301_2.htm.
415. CRE.net, INNER MONG. AUTONOMOUS REGION TWELFTH FIVE RARE EARTHS DEv. GOALS
(Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.cre.net/show.php?contentid=99894.
416. Jiangxi Copper Aluminum, supra note 416.
417. Information Office of the State Council China, SITUATION AND POLICIES OF CHINA'S RARE
EARTH INDUSTRY (June 20,2012), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/bps/t943727.htm.
418. In 2008 the smuggling rare earths was 20,000 tons while it reached 40,000 tons in 2014;
China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3; see also McRae, supra note 54.
419. Supreme People's Court of China, CHINA IN FULL SAIL WITH DEEPENING REFORM,
http://english.court.gov.cn/2016-01/19/content23161215 2.htm (last updated Jan. 19, 2016).
420. Xinhua (,ft", DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND: RARE EARTH MINING PERMITS REDUCED FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS ([Ulil: f (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2012-09/27/c_1 13234656.htm.
421. Supreme People's Court of China, TOP COURT UPHOLDS RECORD PENALTY OF $26M FOR
WATER POLLUTION, http://english.court.gov.cn/2016-01/22/content_23490160.htm (last updated Jan.
22, 2016).
422. N.V., The Difference Engine: More precious than gold, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/rare-earthmetals; BBC, Rare earths mining:
China's 21st Century gold rush, BBC NEWS (June 16, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
pacific-13777439.
423. ; China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 117.512.
424. Ren Kuaibin Kerry (if-ITO 1A, CHINA'S RARE EARTH INDUSTRY WILL CONTINUE TO
INCREASE EFFORTS TO COMBAT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ( ffi it flfi) (Aug.
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is rare that a farmer is accused for such a wrongdoing, e.g., digging some "soil"
from his/her land, by a local government while central government agencies are far
away in Beijing.425  The rare earths could be easily disguised with other
commodities and destined for overseas transport.
VIII. THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCE OF CHINA-RARE EARTHS
RULING
The respondent at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body meeting on May 20,
2015 informed the DSB that it had removed the export duties and export quotas on
rare earths tungsten and molybdenum, as well as the restrictions on trading rights
for enterprises exporting rare earths and molybdenum as recommended by the
Panel.4 26
A. Black Market Smuggling Doubled After the Policy Lifted
Black market rare earths played an important role in the case.427 The
respondent argued that the border control measure, the export license, was directly
related to black market sales and smuggling.428 However, the Panel rebutted that
the license theoretically "incentivized" the smuggling. 429 This could be true in the
United States and Australia where farmers might not have access to the rare earths
resource. People could be sued for the misconduct of trespassing on the property of
others. In China, the existing land system guarantees peasants the security of
having a piece of land.430 The People's Congress passed a Law of Land Contract
in Rural Areas in 2002, which specified that the entire rights of use be contracted
to farmers' households for the "long term," which meant a lifetime. 4 31 The farmers
have the exclusive control over the contracted land.432 It facilitates the stealing of
soil, particularly, in southern China.433
When the border control in dispute in the case was lifted, the illegal rare
earths in turn were sold to the black market.434 Business Insider reported that there
were as much as 40,000 tons of the vital technology metals smuggled out of the
10, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2014-08/10/c_126852328.htm.
425. Jailin Zhang, China's Slow-motion Land Reform, HOOVER INSTITUION (FEB. 1, 2010)
http://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-slow-motion-land-reform.
426. World Trade Organization, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten, and Molybdenum, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: DISPUTE DS431 (May 21, 2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/cases_e/ds431 _e.htm.
427. Stanway, supra note 55.
428. See China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3.
429. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.429.
430. Jim Yardley, China Enacts Major Land-Use Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/world/asia/20china.htm.
431. Jialin Zhang, supra note 427.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. China's Rare-Earths Bust, THE WALL STREET J. (JUL. 18, 2016)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-rare-carths-bust-1468860856.
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country last year.435 Compared to the situation before the WTO ruling, the U.S.
Congressional report cited, "About 20,000 tons of rare earths were smuggled from
China in 2008, which was estimated to have accounted for one third of the total
volume of rare earths leaving China that year." 436 After lifting the measures to be
in conformity with WTO recommendations, the smuggled rare earths supply
doubled.43 7
Reuters reported that the easier black market access partly attributed to
the recent international price slip.43 8 The cancellation of the quota and license
eased the availability of the black market. 439
Pursuant to the consequence caused by applying the WTO
recommendations, the hypothesis of the theoretical approach by focusing on the
text was probably not correct. After lifting the "incentive" measures, the "effects"
indicated the opposite, that the smuggling and illegal extraction increased.4 4 0 In
EC-Tariff Preferences, the Panel reviewed the effects of the drug arrangements in
this report, which revealed that the product coverage under the drug arrangements
decreased by 31% from 1999 through 2001.441 The Panel concluded the policy did
not contribute to the goal.4 2  Whereas, similar to the effects here, the prices
increased due to the measures in dispute, which the Panel adventured in theory,
were proved opposite.443  Therefore, according to EC-Tariff Preferences, the
Panel's hypothesis in China-Rare Earths should be rejected based on the fact.444
B. The Market Crashed After the WTO Ruling
The application of the WTO ruling was devastating to the industry across
the world. Mining.com cited, according to the China Rare Earths Annual Report,
that 90% of Chinese Rare Earths resources companies suffered a loss. 4 45 China
Daily reported that 90% of rare earth mining firms slipped into the red.446
Molycorp was in deeper trouble due to its stock price crash." 7
435. Stanway, supra note 55.
436. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 15.
437. Northern Rare Earth, supra note 9.
438. Stanway, supra note 55.
439. Zhongguo Jingji Yu Riben Qiye 2015 Nian Baipishu [China Economy and Japanese
Companies 2015 White Paper] 103 (2015).
440. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, TT 7.410, 7.425.
441. BUTCHER, supra note 150.
442. Id.
443. MORRISON & TANG, supra note 9, at 23. Beside of the explanation at Part I (C), "Average
prices for imported Chinese rare earths have dropped sharply since September 2011, falling to $46,694
per metric ton in February 2012, a 70.5% decline." In fact, the price slashed by 70.5% before this
dispute started.
444. BUTCHER, supra note 150.
445. Cecilia Jamasmie, Most Chinese rare earth miners running at a loss - report, MINING.COM
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.mining.com/most-chinese-rare-earth-miners-running-at-a-loss-report/.
446. Lyu Chang & Yuan Hui, Rare earth mining firms slip into the red, CHINADAILY USA,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-08/11/content_21565705.htm (last updated Aug. 11, 2015).
447. Myles Udland, Rare Earth Metals Were Supposed To Be The 'Can't-Lose' Investment of the
Decade - Look How That Turned Out, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 16, 2014),
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1. The Decline of the Overall P rice Index
The rare earths price declined sharply. 4 4 8 According to the Association of
China Rare Earth Industry, which has been monitoring the price on behalf its
members, the price dropped significantly after the WTO dispute. 449 According to
China Security, the price of the rare earths fell around 70%.450 The data below was
released at the China Rare Earths Annual Conference sponsored by the Association
of China Rare Earth Industry. 451
Exhibit 9452 Rare Earths Price Index
Source: China Rare Earths Association
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According to this chart, the price index was around 200 points on October
8 of 2013, but took a nose-dive to 108 points on September 15, 2015 .~
http://www.businessinsider.com/molycorp-decline-in-2014-2014-9.
448. Markus Wagner, WTO Law and the Right to Regulate: China - Rare Earths, American
Society of International Law (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/10/wto-
law-and-right-regulate-china-%E2%80%93-rare-earths.
449. Id.
450. China Securities Journal ( SPEED SIX RARE EARTH INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION
GROUP RESTRUCTURING IS COMPLETED (WITH SHARES) AT THE END ('t^k jf-
A. (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsxw/201508/t2015081 1_4774925.html.
451. Association of China Rare Earth Industry, OCTOBER 14 RARE EARTH PRICES (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://www.ac-rei.org.cn/portal.php?mod=view&aid=4036; see also China Securities Journal, supra
469.
452. Association of China Rare Earth Industry, supra note 453.
453. Id.
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2. The Price Decline of the Rare Earths in the International Market and the
Last Stroke to Molycorp
This research looked to Bloomberg.com and rare earth companies.45 4 The
price change of seventeen-rare earth-element-metals suffered a downturn from the
July of 2012 to October 23, 2015, on which the data was collected.455
Exhibit 10: The Price Change (2012.0 7-2015.10.23)
Compared to the domestic price-drop, the chart shows that the f.b.o
international sale 456 slid even more significantly. 457 The reasons of the price crash
are discussed below in detail.
The known impact on the international producers and the rare earth sector
is devastating. More than just those companies listed by the respondent were
affected, and international producers have been impacted as well. According to the
Wall Street Journal, "in the first 11 months of last year, the value of China's rare-
earth exports fell 33% from a year earlier, according to customs data" after China
dropped the decade-old quota.458 Most western producers had to decrease or stop
454. See generally Home Page, ASiAN METAL http://www.asianmetal.com/ (last visited Nov. 21",
2016).
455. Australian Rare Earths, supra note 336.
456. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.643.
457. This website is recommended by Bloomberg.com for Rare Earths. The data was collected
through peer comparison between the price of 2012.07.25 and the price of 2015.10.23. We also supply
the data provided by China counterpart. Asian Metal Inc., 8' International Rare Earth Summit, AsIAN
METAL, http://www.asianmetal.com/RareEarthsPrice/RareEarths.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
458. Chuin-Wei Yap, China Ends Rare-Earth Minerals Export Quotas, WALL ST. . (Jan. 5, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-ends-rare-earth-minerals-export-quotas-1420441285.
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mining after the China-rare earths ruling was handed down.459 Jeb Handwerger,
president of the United States Mining Development Corp warned, "don't ignore
the rare-earth sector because of low rare-earth prices and the failure of the Western
producers." 460
Exhibit 11: Rare Earths Elements Prices & US Molycorp Stock Price
A Rare Rise and Fall
Molycorp, the only U.S.-based rare-earths producer. benefitted from an
extraordinary bubble and has struggled to turn a profit since prices collapsed.
Prices of four key rare earths Share-price performance
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Due to measures in dispute lifted in accordance with the Panel's rulings,
there are more supplies from both legal and black markets as discussed above.462
This led to the price failure of the key rare earths because of the supply increase,
particularly from the black market.463 Business Insider reported 40,000 tons of the
vital technology metals, which were smuggled out of the country last year, drove
down global prices.464 Molycorp Inc., the only rare earth miner and producer in
operation in the U.S., lost its profit, crashed in stock market, and filed a bankruptcy
protection earlier in 2015.465 Of the companies located in the repondent's
459. Jonathan Kaiman, supra note 117.
460. Myra P. Saefong, Rare-earth elements are poised for a recovery, MARKET WATCH (Aug. 19,
2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/rare-earth-elements-are-poised-for-a-recovery-2015-08-19.
461. John W. Miller, Molycorp Struggles to Survive Rare-Earths Bubble, WALL ST. J. (May 31,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/molycorp-struggles-to-survive-rare-earths-bubble-1433110948.
462. See Robert Wright, Boom in once-scarce 'rare earth' metals end in US miner's bust,
FINANCIAL TIMES (June 25, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/295aedea-lb4c-Ile5-al30-
2e7db721f996.
463. Id
464. Stanway, supra note 55.
465. Rare Earth Investing News, 6 Top Rare Earth-producing Countries: A Look at Rare Earth
Production, RARE EARTH INVESTING (July 14, 2016), http://investingnews.com/daily/resource-
investing/critical-metals-investing/rare-earth-investing/top-rare-earth-producing-countries-2013-usgs-2;
Saefong, supra note 462.
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territory, Molycorp was the most significant producer in operation.466 Its equity
price change is correlated to the price of rare earth products of the international
market.467 The correlation coefficient is strong as demonstrated in the chart
above.468
C. Summary
The WTO recommendations to China-Rare Earths case were either not
"necessary" or probably not well decided. The consequence of the ruling is
devastating to the whole industry across the world.
IX. CONCLUSION
Based on the review of the China-Rare Earths case and the relevant law,
it would be difficult in accepting that any defense under Art. XX (g) is still
necessary for respondents when an issue between environment and trade is brought
to the WTO, where the Panel will apply the Environment and Trade principles and
the "next to impossible" legal test standard. The China-Rare Earths case further
raises the concern over the "unconfined" discretion of the Panel regarding both the
applicable legal theories and the approach.469
From a broader perspective, the WTO's failure to update its "trade and
environment working principles" has raised the conflict with other broadly adopted
international laws.47o When looking at this case closely, as stated in the Panel
report, protection of human, animal and plant life from harm under Art. XX (b)
became illegal.471 Such a result has risen "to the level of being manifestly absurd
or unreasonable." 472 The China-Rare Earths case ruling resulted not only in WTO
self-contradiction to its own objectives, e.g., sustainable development and
improving living standard,473 but also the judgment overlooked human rights and
the ongoing international community environmental efforts for better living
conditions.
Lastly, the judgments in China-Rare Earths and other WTO
environmental cases could eventually hurt the investors and industries.
Concluding the WTO is innocent and free of responsibility for the devastating
effects caused to the rare earths industry in the respondent country and to other
466. See Press Release, Molycorp Announces New Rare Earth Complex is Operational and
Ramping Up Toward Full-Scale Production, PEGASUS CAPITAL ADVISORS (Jan. 10, 2013),
467. Miller, supra note 78 (The correlated market behavior is reflected in the similar figures of the
international rare earths prices and the stock equity changes of Molycorp).
468. Id. (It is a mathematical summary of the description).
469. See generally, China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3.
470. See Monica Mylordou, Does Free Trade Undermine International Rules Protecting the
Environment?, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENTS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.e-
ir.info/2014/09/24/does-free-trade-undermine-intemational-rules-protecting-the-
environment/#_ftnref36.
471. China-Rare Earths Panel Report, supra note 3, 17.111.
472. Id.
473. Sustainable Development, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/envir-e/sust-dev e.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
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international producers, e.g., Molycorp, is probably unjustifiable. Along with the
competition of Regional Trade Agreements, the WTO, as the exclusive trade
agency, could be finally marginalized if it continues to adhere to its current
standard, thereby, deteriorating WTO's influence in the international community.

